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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
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The events of November 1989 launched the Czechs into a truly revolutionary 
transformation process. Within a very short time the old order virtually collapsed, 
and the new political leaders as well as the population at large were confronted 
with the complex task of creating and adapting to a new social, economic, 
political, national and, last but not least, global order. As the country was 
liberated from its subordinate position in the relatively closed and static USSR- 
led “socialist camp” it was also immediately exposed to an incalculable multitude 
of new impulses and pressures, possibilities and constraints in all these spheres.
The Czech émigré writer Josef Skvoreckÿ has suggested the phrase ‘ from 
the zoo to the jungle” as a metaphor for this process, which created a great need 
for some fixed points of reference. Since the “velvet revolution” the Czechs have 
therefore witnessed an intensive struggle not just about political and economic 
power in the country, but also about the broader interpretation of these events. 
One might call it a fight about a “meta-narrative”, about the formation of a dis­
course that could make sense of the enormous changes and justify political action. 
A very important aspect of this has been the interpretation of the nation’s identity 
and role in the surrounding world. This requested the creation and reinforcement 
of a new’ perception of nation and state (accentuated by the split of 
Czechoslovakia in 1992) and the accommodation or “opening” of this national 
self-perception to the consequences of the “globalisation” that the country was 
exposed to after the fall of communism.
In the Czech case these narratives have focussed intensively on “Europe” 
as a metaphorical “home” for the nation and on “européanisation” as a label for 
the desired accommodation to the surrounding world. As the then Czech Prime 
Minister Vaclav Klaus expressed it in December 1993, “the question of our 
position in Europe today and in the future is in fact the question o f our national 
and state identity”.1 The slogan of a “return to Europe” is a fine example of this 
use of Europe as a metaphor. In the perspective of homecoming all the new things 
that were to be introduced - from a new political system to new habits of 
everyday life - were domesticised and given historical credibility, and with all its 
connotations of the prodigal son the slogan also contained a clear appeal to 
“Europe” for acceptance.
At a more concrete political level, the EC/EU inevitably became a centre 
of gravity and point of reference for the whole transformation. Shortly after
1 teska  republika a myslenka evropske integrace, speech at the reception of the Konrad 



























































































coming to power in November 1989 the new Czechoslovak leaders expressed 
their wish for membership, and this has remained official Czechoslovak (and 
since 1993 Czech) policy ever since. It took, however, a long and complicated 
process before the EU in 1997 complied with these aspirations and decided to 
initiate negotiation talks in late March 1998 with the Czech Republic and five 
other countries.
The theme of this paper is the evolution of a Czech discourse on Europe 
and the EU from 1989 to 1997 with an emphasis on the later years. Many actors 
- politicians, writers and journalists, scholars and others - have taken part in its 
formation, but it seems fair to suggest that the two key figures in the given period 
have been Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus. Both have had high political offices 
(Havel as Czechoslovak and later Czech President, Klaus as Czechoslovak 
Minister of Finance and then Czech Prime Minister). Both have very actively 
propagated their views at home and abroad, since the evolving narrative has had 
to be addressed both to the Czech population and to the surrounding world. Also, 
in much the two represent two different approaches to politics, two different 
views of the world, and as a consequence two different attempts at creating 
authoritative narratives about the Czechs and Europe/the EU.
Most of the following will therefore consist in a close analysis of the 
discourses of Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus on Europe, the EU and the Czech 
Republic as they can be detected through a careful reading of speeches and 
articles, political declarations etc. The aim is to present a detailed picture of how 
these two key actors have striven to develop authoritative interpretations of the 
long process that now seems to result in Czech membership of the EU. Other 
main political actors will then be more briefly introduced before some general 
conclusions are made. But first a brief outline of developments in Czech EC/EU 
policies since 1989 and of decision-making in Czech foreign policy is offered in 
order to present a setting for these discourses.
The paper is thus confined to a few key actors from the Czech political 
elite. It abstains from discussing the “mass perception” of these questions, 
including public opinion about the EU and Czech membership as measured in 
Euro-barometers and other polls. To some extent this is justifiable, since for the 
whole period Czech debates about Europe and the EU have been confined to 
some very small groups. Also, these elites to a large extent establish the 
parameters (if not necessarily the attitudes) that will set a framework for a later 
broader public debate about Czech membership before a possible referendum. 
Unfortunately it also goes beyond the scope of the present investigation to study 





























































































2. Czech Relations with the EC/EU
In general terms, one may discern three phases in Czech(-oslovak) policies 
towards the EC/EU and Europe at large since 1989. The first phase, lasting until 
1992 and rhetorically expressed in the slogan of a "return to Europe", was 
characterised by the following priorities:
First of all there was an urgent wish to liberate the country from Soviet 
hegemony, starting with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak 
territory, and to break with the institutions of the socialist past, i.e. the Warsaw 
Pact and the CMEA (COMECON). This was all achieved by 1991. Secondly, in 
the policies of “homecoming”, utopianism mixed with pragmatism in the sense 
that Czechoslovak leaders oscillated between calls for new all-European co­
operative structures (a “natural” expectation now the “unnatural” division of Eu­
rope into hostile blocs was being abandoned), and a wish to join already existing 
western European structures, primarily the EC and the Council of Europe. 
Utopianism was primarily to be found in the sphere of security politics, where the 
dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact was initially envisaged, and the 
CSCE presented as the nucleus of a new security system. Already in May 1990, 
however, President Havel acknowledged the vitality of NATO, and from 1991 
Czechoslovak leaders began to advocate Czechoslovak membership of the 
organisation.'
The “utopian” line of thought also briefly made itself felt in the attitude to 
the Council of Europe. Membership of the Council was a main Czechoslovak 
priority, because of the strong emphasis on human rights and democracy in the 
new Czechoslovak foreign policy and because admission, unlike with the EC, 
was possible even within a short time perspective.’ Speaking to the Council in 
Strasbourg in May 1990 Vaclav Havel claimed that he could "see no reason why 
your Parliamentary Assembly and your executive bodies could not be the core 
around which a future European Confederation would crystallise,”2 *4 This idea of 
the Council of Europe, rather than the EC, as the core of politically united Europe
2 See Sedivy (1994/95). Bradi (1992), and Cottey (1995), Chapter 5. The “memoirs” of 
Jaroslav Sedivy, Foreign Minister October 1997 - July 1998, about the first year of 
Czechoslovak foreign policy making after November 1989 focus almost exclusively on these 
secunty issues (Sedivy 1997).
5 Czechoslovakia did become a member in February 1991 and even after the division of the 
country, the Czech Republic has been very active in the Council. Bradi (1992), p. 126 ff. See 
also the home-page of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Informace o radè Evropy 
<http://www.czech.cz/czech/144.htm> (as of September 1998).
4 Speech to the Council of Europe, May 10, 1990; quoted from Havel (1997b), p.42; Czech 




























































































was very similar to the visions on the role of the CSCE in the field of security, 
and it was brought up occasionally in 1990-1991.
Closer and better ties to the EC were a major priority. Before November 
1989 Czechoslovak relations with the EC had been modest, even in comparison 
with the neighbouring socialist countries. Diplomatic relations were established 
in September 1988 and a trade agreement signed in December that year. At the 
same time, however, a far more favourable agreement on trade and co-operation 
between the EC and Hungary entered into force, and in July 1989 an ambitious 
aid programme, PHARE, was set up for the reform countries Poland and 
Hungary. It thus became a key issue for the new Czechoslovak leadership to join 
ranks with Hungary and Poland. In late December 1989, Prime Minister Marian 
Calfa even sent a letter to Jacques Delors asking for early talks about “possible 
forms o f affiliation to the European Community”.5 6Delors replied with a general 
warning against exaggerated expectations and premature steps, which led to a 
moderation of Czechoslovak demands. In March 1990 a trade agreement similar 
to Hungary’s from 1989 was concluded and in May Czechoslovakia was included 
in the PHARE programme.
Czechoslovak foreign politics in these years was characterised by a great 
emphasis on regional co-operation with Hungary and Poland in what came to be 
known as the “Visegrad group",b both in dismantling of the structures of old and 
in dealings with the EC. The pressure from the three countries for closer and 
more committed relations with the EC led from August 1990 to negotiations 
about a new kind of Association Agreement, a so-called “Europe Agreement'', 
and the three held frequent consultations during the negotiations, resulting also 
in the issuing of joint memoranda and policy statements.
In December 1991, at a common ceremony, bilateral Europe Agreements 
were signed between the EC and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In the 
preceding negotiations Czechoslovakia had interpreted the Europe Agreements 
as a means to support the country’s political and economic reforms and as a 
vehicle to EC accession. The EC, however, refused to include the membership 
perspective in the Agreement so as a compromise, membership was mentioned 
in the preamble as a Czechoslovak objective. The Agreement also opened up a 
continuing political dialogue. Economically the Agreement was not altogether 
satisfactory from a Czechoslovak perspective, since a number of sensitive sectors 
were excepted from the promised general opening of the EC market to the
5 Quoted from Brach (1992), p. 123.





























































































Visegrad three. Importantly, the Agreement obliged the associated countries to 
adjust their legal systems to the acquis communautaire.'
The first phase may be said to have ended with the change of government 
after the elections in June 1992 and the succeeding division of Czechoslovakia. 
The new Czech government with Vaclav Klaus as Prime Minister and Josef 
Zieleniec as Foreign Minister was dominated by economists with a very different 
background from that of the “old” dissident elites, and the change of political 
course was pronounced. Vladimir Handl has compared the new government’s 
turn towards a more reserved perception of the “co-operative and the institutional 
potential o f international politics” to a move from the theoretical position of 
“liberal institutionalism” to that of “realism”. This was expressed in concrete 
terms in an outright rejection of any Visegrad co-operation or “collectivism” 
(except for inter-governmental agreements on trade) and in many a critical remark 
about the “Maastricht Treaty EU”.7 8
The new government believed that the Czech Republic had better chances 
of joining the EC/EU quickly (still an official priority) without Slovakia and other 
Visegrad neighbours, and it was very optimistic in its evaluation of the Czech 
performance, especially in the economic field which was considered crucial to 
EU accession. Thus Klaus could say that the Czech Republic was in no hurry to 
join the present EU and at the same time declare that “we will be ready to join the 
EU earlier than the EU will be ready to accept us”.9
At the concrete “bilateral” level of Czech-EU relations results were more 
modest. The Klaus government believed that the Europe Agreement (which was
7 For a detailed account of the Czechoslovak negotiation strategy and an evaluation of the 
result see Jezek (1995a). See also Jezek (1995b), Had et al. (1997), p.34 ff, and Mangott 
(1995) p.100 f. In a later Czech evaluation, Jin Zemanek expresses the view that “competition 
between [the Visegrad countries] increased the importance o f the political element to the 
detriment o f economic results (Zemanek et al. (1997), p.147. This view was also typical for 
the line of thinking of the Klaus government.
8 Handl (1995). pl30 ff., 133 ff; see also Handl (1993), p.129 f. and Cihlar & Hrich (1995), 
p.333. Vaclav Klaus even claimed that Visegrad was “an artificial creation o f the West”, and 
although this viewpoint is exaggerated and misleading there certainly were signals from J. 
Delors and the EC after 1989 that such a co-operation was appreciated. In the preparations for 
the Copenhagen summit in June 1993 the Visegrad countries therefore still acted collectively, 
but in the end Visegrad was abandoned not only by Klaus, but also by the EU, which in 
Copenhagen spoke only of “states with Europe Agreements" (this now included Rumania and 
Bulgaria) without paying attention to regional subgroups. See Rhodes (1998b), Royen (1994), 
p.403 f, Jezek (1995b), p.270 ff, and Handl (1995), p.140.
9 Klaus for International Herald Tribune, Feb. 1, 1993, quoted from Handl (1995), p.136, note 




























































































not ratified by Czechoslovakia before the split) could simply be transferred to the 
two new states, but in the end a new Agreement had to be negotiated which in 
some respects was less favourable to the Czech Republic than the previous one.10 1
1993 nevertheless did bring a breakthrough for all Europe Agreement countries 
in the sense that the June 1993 Copenhagen summit recognised for the first time 
their wish to become members of the Union (the abolition of some trade barriers 
was also accelerated). But membership requirements were defined in very general 
terms and included a reference to the Union’s “capacity' to absorb new 
members"." So although Copenhagen was a welcome step forward, there w'as 
still no time-table for membership, nor any specific guidelines for the preparation 
thereof. Nor did 1994 bring the Czechs much closer to membership, in spite of 
a decision in Essen in December to improve the “structured dialogue” w'ith the 
applicant countries and develop a strategy for membership preparation.12
In sum then, the second phase, which lasted until 1995, was characterised 
by a certain standstill in Czech-EU relations. Government declarations gave a 
rather contradictory picture of calls for an early admission on the one hand and 
vocal “Euro-scepticism” on the other. The net effect in practical politics was 
summarised by one critical observer as "Euro-passivity".l3
By 1995 new dynamics began to make themselves felt on both sides, 
introducing the third phase which may be said to have lasted until the December 
1997 decision to open concrete accession talks. The Czech government gradually 
came to understand that the “solitary” approach did not bring the expected results 
and that its boasting might be counterproductive. Thus, Hans van den Broek at 
one point had to tell Klaus that "it is not the European Union which wants to join 
the Czech Republic”.14 15As Rhodes argues, the Czechs had also underestimated 
western interest in Poland and the fact that the main goal for western Europe was 
to extend political stability eastwards, which could best be served by an 
enlargement in groups. Finally, especially from 1996 onwards, the growing 
problems of the Czech economy and of the Klaus government led to a moderation
15in tone.
A renewed Czech interest in regional co-operation and co-ordination began 
to make itself felt. In particular, relations to Poland improved markedly and the
10 The Agreement was signed in October 1993 and went into force on 1 February 1995. Handl 
(1995), p. 136 f„ Handl (1993), p.130 f.
11 Agenda 2000(1997), 1.
12 See Lippert & Becker (1997), de Weydenthal (1995), p.300 ff., Biischer & von Ow (1995).
13 Jaks(1994), 148.
14 Quoted from Rhodes (1998b), note 41.




























































































co-operation in CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement - originally a 
Visegrad economic offshoot) gathered momentum. Vaclav Havel’s speech from 
February 1995 on the Czech-German relationship, which was to bring new 
dynamism to the tepid Czech relations to their most important neighbour, may 
also be seen in this light. On the inner lines too there was increased activity: a 
Government Committee for European Integration with a Working Committee and 
several Working Groups was created by 1 January 1995, new initiatives were 
taken to accelerate the approximation of Czech laws with EC laws, and finally on 
23 January 1996, the Czech government submitted its application for EU-me- 
mbership (eventually as the last but one of the ten central and east European 
applicants; only Slovenia came later).16
There were also significant new initiatives from the EU. The White Paper 
of May 1995 finally offered specific suggestions for how to prepare for 
participation at the inner market, and the Madrid summit of December 1995 
decided that concrete accession talks were to begin six months after the 
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference. The Commission was also 
asked to prepare an evaluation of the readiness for membership of each applicant 
country which was to be presented immediately after the Conference. The Agenda 
2000 was presented after the Amsterdam summit and in December 1997 the 
decision was made to start negotiation talks with the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus in the so-called first round.17
3. Decision-makers and Decision-making in Czech Foreign Politics
An urgent task for the new political elites after 1989 was to redefine the political 
system, including the relationship between President and Government (and 
between the Federation and the two Republics, which eventually before the split 
of Czechoslovakia both created their own “Foreign Ministries”). Political 
tradition from the inter-war years and the structures inherited from the “socialist” 
Czechoslovak Constitution from 1960 suggested a parliamentary, rather than a 
presidential model. But until 1992 the President had a very strong influence, not 
the least upon Czechoslovak foreign politics. This owed much to Vaclav Havel’s 
personality, but Havel also created an Office of the President which in the
16 See Zemanek et al. (1997). For a more critical evaluation of law approximation policies see 
Desny (1997). See also “Vztahy CR-EU” on the home-page of the Czech Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: <http://www.czedi.cz/czech/14l.htm> (as of September 1998).
17 Agenda 2000 (1997), Had et al. (1997), p.39-48, von Ow (1996), von Ow (1997). For a 





























































































unstable constitutional situation was seen by some critics as a "parallel power 
structure” beside the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, 
the critique of a “lack of professionalism” in Czechoslovak foreign policy was 
mostly aimed at Flavel’s advisors, although the Ministry too struggled with a lack 
of competent staff. In spite of occasional bad co-ordination, conflicts between the 
President and the Ministry were few due to the close personal ties between Havel 
and Foreign Minister Jin Dienstbier, both signatories of Charter 77.1 ̂
The Czech Constitution of December 16, 1992 establishes a parliamentary 
political system. Presidential powers are limited, but in foreign relations the 
President retains a key constitutional role to play. As “Head o f State" (Art. 54), 
the President shall “represent the State with respect to other countries", 
“negotiate and ratify international treaties” and "be the supreme commander of 
the armed forces" (Alt. 63-1, a-c). Article 63-3, however, holds that presidential 
decisions in these fields "shall be valid only if countersigned by the Prime 
Minister or by a member o f the Government so authorised by the Prime 
Minister". The Constitution thus forces the government and the President to co­
operate, especially in foreign politics where the President as Head of State 
represents and is responsible for a political course developed by the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister and the government.18 9
Assessments of the actual foreign policy making process in the Czech 
Republic tend to be critical. Handl and Moorhouse agree that decision making is 
highly centralised. There is little delegation of tasks and little use of or even 
dialogue with experts, social interest groups or the general public. As also the 
pool of professionals is narrow, even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since, 
as Handl complains, the education of new professionals is neglected) the outcome 
has often been a policy marked by a lack of realism and with problems of 
communication, both with the EU, and between the Czech key actors.20
18 Brach (1992). p. 15 ff„ 113 ff„ Sedivy (1997).
19 Handl (1995). 144 f., Gerloch el al. (1994), 101 ff.; English translation of the Constitution 
from the home-page of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
<littp:/Av\vw.c:ecli.c;/english/constinaion.htinl> (as of September 1998). According to Handl, 
the role of the Parliament in foreign policy is rather limited, although of course the Parliament 
has its own Committee for Foreign Affairs (as the Senate its Committee for Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Security). It also has the Parliamentary Association Committee, a forum for 
members of the Czech and the European Parliaments meeting regularly twice a year, see Desny 
(1997), 51.
20 Moorhouse (1996), 367-71. Handl argues that the open disagreement and contradictions in 
the declarations of top government politicians may be influenced by the political appointment 
of Deputy Ministers seeking (as there is a coalition government) to profile their own party, 
while Pehe speaks of a tradition being taken up from the First Republic of rigid partisanship 




























































































As early as in September 1991 the Czechoslovak government decided, 
followed by the Czech government in October, that all drafts of new laws should 
aim at compatibility with EC/EU law and that specific reasons should be given 
for any incompatibility. The decision was important as proof of the Czechoslovak 
will to join the EC, and because it made EC law a source of inspiration for 
Czechoslovak (and Czech) legal reform at a time when most of the reform 
programme was still on the drawing board.21 Later figures have often been 
presented to demonstrate the high percentage of Czech laws already compatible 
with EC law, but according to Desny the project of legal self-approximation has 
suffered from serious flaws.22
In 1995 the government seemed to react to the problems or criticism. The 
White Paper brought more specific guidance from the EU, and in March that year 
the government adopted a timetable of measures to be taken to accelerate the 
process of legal approximation. Also, it began to make more extensive use of 
legal assistance from the PHARE programme, which greatly increased the 
ministries’ access to information about EC law and about the overall state of legal 
approximation.23 The creation in 1995 of the Government Committee for 
European Integration (headed by the Prime Minister and aided by a Working 
Committee and twenty three Working Groups) also suggests a new concern for 
the domestic preparation of membership, although the Government Committee 
has met only once or twice a year. The interim Tosovsky government tried to 
speed up preparations before the commencement of accession talks in late March 
1998, but Czech press comments were still sceptical of the quality of 
preparations.24
(1995), 145-7; Pehe (1998), 63.
21 Zemanek (1997), 154; Desny (1997), 45; Cihlar & Hnch (1995), 328.
Most importantly, the government’s purely economic approach to the transformation of 
Czech society has led to a negligence of law as such and thus of the consistency of the legal 
framework. Moreover, a lack of resources (financial and personal) has resulted in severe 
weaknesses in the implementation of the law. Also, there was little guidance to get from the 
EC/EU as how to conceive this legal reform in details. Desny (1997), 45 f. For approximation 
figures from 1994 see Zemanek (1997), 155.
-3 Zemanek (1997), p. 155 f. Desny (1997), p.47 f. is full of praise of the PHARE programme 
but critical of the implementation on the Czech side. See also the evaluation in Agenda 2000 
(1997), p.7. A government decision (“usnesenf' ) of July 16, 1997 (No. 432/97) gives more 
specific methodological instructions to all ministries for how to ensure the continued legal 
approximation. Full Czech texts of this and other government decisions can be found at the 
home-page of the Czech government: <http://www.vlada.cz/>.
24 Vlada se dohodla, jak bude zeme jednat s unit (“The government has decided how the 
country will negotiate with the Union”), Mlada Fronta Dues, March 3, 1998, p.2, Michal 




























































































One may conclude that the Czech approach to EU questions has suffered 
from an insufficient co-ordination of policies as well as from an insufficient 
implementation of legal and other decisions. According to both Desnÿ and the 
Agenda 2000, many problems are caused by the lack of public administration 
modernisation or even plans or policies for it, which again may be seen as a result 
of the negligence of the public administration by the Klaus government, the 
inclination to highly centralised decision-making and the general self-assured 
attitude of Czech politicians to their country’s readiness for membership.21
4. Perceptions of the EC/EU in the Political Elites
As argued Czech foreign policy elites are very narrow. In terms of general policy 
making one might, especially after the creation of the Czech Republic in 1993, 
feel tempted to focus almost exclusively on the government, especially on the 
Prime and the Foreign Ministers, while the role of the opposition has been 
marginal. The President has, however, remained important, not the least because 
Havel after 1989 soon possessed himself of the field of foreign politics. Since 
then he has successfully used his office to become the representative face and 
voice of the Czech Republic abroad, as well as a key interpreter of its foreign 
policies to a domestic audience.
4.1. The President
At home and abroad Vaclav Havel incarnates the continuity of Czech post­
communist policies, despite the split of Czechoslovakia in 1992 and changes of 
government. Here, we shall focus first on his views (and the views of other 
prominent dissidents) before 1989, then on developments in his perceptions and 
attitudes during the two years of his Czechoslovak presidency, when most of his 
foreign policy perceptions took shape), and finally on developments in his views 
as Czech president since 1993. 25
Frontci Dues, March 4. 1998, 12. Desny (1997), 50 ff. has a good survey of the bodies 
(domestic and bilateral) dealing with the Czech integration to the EU, see also the home-page 
of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Vztahy CR-EU:
<http://www.czech.cz/czech/141.htm> (as of September 1998). Interestingly, the home-page 
of the Czech government does not even list the Government Committee for European 
Integration, while there is extensive information about the Government Committee for the 
preparation of NATO membership. See: <http://www.vlada.cz/> (as of September 1998).
25 In the words of Agenda 2000: “Confident in its progress towards meeting the obligations 
of EU membership, the Czech Republic has at times shown signs of reluctance to acknowledge 




























































































Until November 1989 the communist Czechoslovak regime’s approach to 
European developments remained deeply conservative, aiming at the preservation 
of a pre-Gorbachev status-quo and paying only lip service to his rhetorics of a 
“common European house”26. By contrast, there was a lively debate about Europe 
in dissident circles, especially in the mid-1980’s. Much attention was paid to the 
nature of “central Europe” - the key “victim” of the bipolar division into an “east­
ern” and a “western” Europe, it was held - a debate launched by the Czech émigré 
writer Milan Kundera in 1984.27 But in the domestic discussion, in which Havel, 
Dienstbier and other later prominent political actors took part, attempts were also 
made to analyse the political situation in Europe as a whole and make suggestions 
for its improvement. Dienstbier’s book Dreaming about Europe from 1985 is a 
particularly remarkable example of this, whereas Vaclav Havel before 1989 
largely confined himself to general reflections upon the present state of modern 
societies east and west of the “Iron Curtain”.
In their political reflections the dissidents focussed almost exclusively on 
security issues and on seeking ways to overcome the division of Europe. In their 
call for a united Europe without nationalism, Dienstbier and Charter 77 also 
explicitly recognised the German right to unification within existing borders.28
The attitude to western Europe and particularly to the USA was mainly 
critical. The West was blamed for its passivity and for its interest in preserving 
status-quo. This view also affected the perception of the western European
4.1.1. Perceptions of Europe and the EC in the Dissident Elites Before 1989
26 Robejsek (1990). 29 ff.
27 Kundera’s main argument is, put very bnefly, that Russia (in the shape of the Soviet Union) 
represents another civilisation, totally alien to (western) Europe, and that the Russian 
occupation of central Europe since 1945 is not only military and political, but also cultural. 
This is fatal since central Europe represents a special, vitally important part of the western 
European historical and cultural experience. Thus European culture as such is threatened by 
the Russian politics of cultural annihilation. The West, however, is rapidly abandoning the 
values upon which its modem civilisation had rested for 400 years. Here culture has “already 
bowed out” and a "postcultural” era begun, and in being blind to the central European tragedy 
western Europe demonstrates that it has forgotten the very essence that makes Europe itself 
a value, see Kundera (1984).
28 Dienstbier (1986; 1990 edn.), p.63 ff. Brach follows how these ideas influenced 
Czechoslovak attitudes to German unification in 1989-1990 (Brach (1992), p.57 ff.). Rhodes, 
who brings a good survey of the character of the “idea of central Europe” in the mid-1980’s, 
argues with Melvin Croan that these ideas ‘found little resonance with the general population 
o f any o f these countries”, since "ordinary people remained much more receptive to 





























































































integration process and the EC, in which there was generally a low interest. Thus 
Dienstbier, quoting the Polish journalist Dawid Warszawski, criticised the 
foundations of western European integration for being “demoralising, 
economically restrictive and politically without much perspective ", as long as 
their price was the slavery of the other half of Europe and as long as “a united 
Europe” and “European unification” in the western European political dictionary 
referred only to western Europe.29 Dienstbier did see in the EEC an "expression 
of a certain emancipation o f the [participating] western European states, which 
contains potential possibilities for greater political enforcement", but he could 
also blame the EEC for being an instrument of the USA to secure the 
consolidation of the bloc system.30
Attitudes to contemporary politics often mixed utopianism with a 
conservative anti-modernism. Dientbier had a touch of it, but the trend was most 
explicit in Havel’s writings, which often linked the crisis of the “post-totalitarian” 
Czechoslovak regime to a general crisis of “modern humanity”. Havel and 
Dienstbier both rejected the idea that it made sense to "renew, create and copy the 
domestic political systems o f the western European countries",31 and in 1978 
Havel described a radical political alternative which in his opinion was already 
taking shape in the “post-democratic” forms of organisation of the dissidents.
After his return from prison in 1983 Havel moderated his critique of 
western European democracies. He remained sceptical of “modern rationalism 
and modern science” and pointed to the bewilderment of “democratic western
29 Dienstbier (1986; 1990 edn.), p. 117.
30 Dienstbier (1986; 1990 edn.), p.l 16, p. 125. In his portrait of the EC Dienstbier focuses at 
least as much on its limitations as on its achievements, although he is not against political 
integration. He also writes that in the globalisation process “Europe can only obtain an equal 
position as a cultural and civilisational whole. This does not have to be a United States o f 
Europe, nor a federation or a confederation, although that too may at a certain degree o f 
development be a serious and promising possibility" (p.22). The content of the monthly 
samizdat journal Lidove Noviny in 1988-1989 is yet another indicator of the low interest in the 
EC. References are scarce and EC developments are not monitored. For example Dienstbier’s 
article “A Chance for Europe" ("Sauce pro Evropu") from August 31, 1989 remarks about 
the plan to remove internal borders between the EC countries before 1993 only that western 
Europe should not forget that “Europe” cannot be created without its “other half’.
31 Dienstbier (1986; 1990 edn), p.91. In his big essay from 1978, The Power o f  the Powerless 
(Moc bezmocnych), Havel comes close to making a virtue of the communist misery: “There 
is no real evidence that Western democracy, that is, democracy o f the traditional 
parliamentary type, can offer solutions that are any more profound. It may even be said that 
the more room there is in the Western democracies (compared to our world) fo r  the genuine 
aims o f life, the better the crisis is hidden from people and the more deeply do they become 




























































































Europe" vis-à-vis the consequences of this its own "ambiguous export":' but in 
1985 Havel noticed the substantial difference in degrees of freedom in western 
and eastern Europe. He called a full commitment to “the ideal o f a democratic 
Europe as a friendly community o f free and independent nations” the "sole 
meaningful wav to genuine European peace"?'
Havel followed up on this at the reception of the Erasmus Prize in 1986. 
To overcome the division of the continent, secure the sovereignty and equal rights 
of all European nations, as well as political democracy and social justice, Havel 
called for the courage to demand the change of the seemingly unchangeable, i.e. 
the bloc system. He also demanded a new popular “European awareness" without 
which government initiatives could never bring an undivided Europe closer. To 
Havel, Europe was an "undivided and indivisible" spiritual, cultural and historical 
unity, a finely woven tissue of mostly small nations. This meant, as argued also 
by Dienstbier, that western Europeans had to understand that their own problems 
(such as the nuclear threat) could not be solved without a solution to the eastern 
European problems. This was as close as Havel came before 1989 to giving a 
political vision of a new Europe.32 4 35*
4.1.2. The formation of Havel's Views 1990-1992
Most importantly, Havel soon embraced the idea of European unity. Speaking to 
the Polish Sejm on 25 January 1990 he still described the Europe to which the 
central European countries wanted to return "as an amicable community of 
independent nations and democratic states, a Europe that is stabilised, not 
divided into blocs and pacts, a Europe that does not need to be defended by 
superpowers":' i.e. in terms similar to those of 1985 as a Europe based on “tradi­
tional” democratic nation states. Soon, however, Havel raised the perspective of 
European political integration, as in Strasbourg in May when he suggested that 
with a new “Helsinki-based” security system "Europe could relatively swiftly
32 See his essay Politics and Conscience (Politika a svedomi) Havel (1984; 1991a edn.), 
p.252,258. Here he also calls the totalitarian regimes “the avant-garde o f a global crisis o f this 
civilisation, first European, then Euro-American, and ultimately global” (p.260).Havel’s 
writings thus contain a tension between a radical rejection of modernity as such as the source 
of man’s alienation from the “natural world" (“Lebenswelt"), including the rejection of 
contemporary forms of politics as mere expressions of a technology of power, and his own 
commitment to principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, all outcomes of 
modernity.
33 Havel (1985; 1991a edn.), p. 314.
34 Havel (1986), p. 85-90.
35 Projev v polskem Sejmu a Senatu; printed in Havel (1990), pp.39-46, quotation on p.44.




























































































In his essay from 1991, Summer Meditations, Havel went further. He 
spoke of the unique chance for the continent to become “one big community , 
based on the principle o f 'unity in diversity"’ and called the idea of a European 
confederation a step in the right direction.37 In the same process, Havel 
downplayed the role of the nation state. “Dreaming” about the future of Czecho­
slovakia in fifteen years time he described a situation where the EC already had 
a strongly integrated political leadership, where borders had become a mere 
formality and where many legal and other competences were delegated to either 
a supra-national or a regional level, i.e. a harmonious vision of a federal Europe.38
Political unity was, according to Havel, not just politically advantageous, 
it followed logically from Europe’s status as one civilisation, based on a shared 
culture, to which the central and eastern European countries had also for centuries 
contributed, until they were brutally forced to depart from their natural path. 
Their “return to Europe” was thus historically legitimate as a return to where they 
already belonged.39
Havel also sought to delimit this civilisation and determine Europe’s 
relations to the USA and the USSR, the two super-powers that the dissidents had 
held responsible for the division of Europe. After 1989, Havel’s view of the USA 
was unequivocally positive. But in his speech to the US Congress in February 
1990 he stressed that Europe should "at last be able to stand guard for itself’,40 
i.e. without American soldiers in Europe. In May 1990 in Strasbourg he went on 
to describe a new peaceful multi-polar security order which "would establish a 
large, European connecting link between the powerfid North American continent
become politically integrated as a democratic community o f democratic states":'0
46 Quoted from Havel (1997b), p.41; Czech original quote in Havel (1990), p.124. Similarly, 
in a speech to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly on 29 June 1990, Havel mentioned the 
“genuine hope o f a politically integrated peaceful and democratic Europe.” Projev ve 
Federalnlm shromazdem; printed in Havel (1990), pp.151-183, quotation on p. 171.
3' Havel (1991b), p.63, p.67.
38 Havel (1991b), p.87.
39 See Havel’s speech at the reception of the Charlemagne Price, Aachen 9 May 1991; printed 
in Havel (1992), pp.77-80. In Summer Meditations Havel comes close to an historical 
teleology when writing that this “return” to political and cultural values that had developed in 
democratic western Europe in the last decades was “a return o f nations who were violently 
alienated from their own traditions, roots and ideals, from themselves, a return to the path, 
on which they already once walked or longed to walk or were potentially predetermined to 
walk as inhabitants o f the same European cultural space. ” Havel (1991b), p.64. There are 
clear parallels to Kundera here (see note 27), although Havel’s teleology is an optimistic one, 
while Kundera’s is apocalyptic.




























































































and the rapidly changing and liberating community o f nations o f today’s Soviet 
Union ” 41 In 1991, however, when Czechoslovakia began to express its interest 
in NATO membership, new accents were heard. In May in Aachen and again in 
Summer Meditations Havel stressed how Europe was “civilisationally deeply tied 
to the North American continent, her younger brother” and how it was necessary 
to preserve these ties.
The attitude to the USSR was more ambiguous. In the US Congress and 
elsewhere Havel spoke of the necessity to help the USSR and warned against its 
isolation, but it was not clear if he saw the USSR as a partner, or as a member of 
the European civilisational community. The “tripartition” of Strasbourg suggested 
partnership only, but in the same speech he also said that he saw no reason why 
“some or all o f the European nations within the present Soviet Union could not 
at the same time be members of a European confederation and o f some eventual 
'post-Soviet' confederation. ”41 *3 Finally at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in July 
1992 he spoke of the need and courage to create a “system o f unity in diversity’ not 
only on a pan-European and Atlantic scale but on a Euro-Asian scale as well’’,44 
thus vaguely implying a dichotomy between Europe and North America on the 
one hand and a post-Soviet “Euro-Asian” community on the other.
Havel also speculated about how to achieve European unity. Here one 
finds a clear shift from “utopianism” to a “pragmatism” linked to what could be 
called Havel’s “discovery” of the EC. In Strasbourg in May 1990 Havel had 
spoken of a future confederal Europe with the Council of Europe as its core, and 
in November 1990, at the CSCE Summit in Paris, he again expressed his support 
of “President Mitterand’s vision” of a pan-European confederation, based on the 
Council of Europe.4' In June 1991 an international conference was even held in 
Prague on this subject, but although formally giving the idea his warm support, 
Havel de facto buried it, at least as an alternative to the EC:
41 Quoted from Havel (1997b), p.41; Czech original in Havel (1990), pp. 114-129, quote on 
p. 123.
4" Havel (1991b), p.64: see also Havel (1992), p.79.
4’ Quoted from Havel (1997b), p.47; Czech original in Havel (1990), pp.114-129, quote on 
p. 128. This might include both the Baltic peoples (probably Havel’s main concern) and the 
Ukrainians or Russians. But a year later in Aachen Havel seemed to distinguish between them 
when saying that "no future European order is thinkable without the European nations o f the 
Soviet Union, which are an inseparable part o f Europe, and without links to the great 
community o f nations the Soviet Union is becoming today.” English translation from 
<http://\vww.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/0905.html>. Original quotation in Havel 
(1992), p.79.
44 English translation from <http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1992/0907.html>. 
Original in Havel (1992), p.194-197; quotation on p.196.




























































































“/  think that the idea o f a pan-European confederation cannot just overlook the 
existence o f the European Community or lake this to be something parallel with and 
unconnected to Europe as a whole, to be some kind o f exclusive club in which the
others have nothing to do. Instead it must understand the European Community as its
>>46driving force, its flag-bearer, as a model fo r  its own future
Havel’s first explicit mentioning of the EC came in Strasbourg in May 1990, or 
rather of the EEC, since the Community was referred to only in an economic 
context. The EEC was called a “distant and almost unattainable horizon'', but 
still the central and eastern European countries should co-ordinate their efforts to 
get closer, just as the EEC ought to create some "flexible transitional ground, on 
which the economies o f these states could more easily recover.'"*1 But in 
November 1990 in Paris Havel said that relations to the EC were very important 
to Czechoslovak foreign policy and that his country, like Hungary and Poland, 
would like to become ordinary members in the future, a wish also repeated in his 
New Year’s Address on January 1, 1991.4S
Speaking to NATO in Brussels in March 1991 Havel expressed his belief 
that the planned association with the EC would allow his country to take part in 
the debates about its political union including its security and defence aspects.46 789 *
From then on he was very explicit about the significance of EC membership, as 
at the European Confederation conference. In his 1992 New Year’s Address he 
called the Europe Agreement the “perhaps most important treaty in our post-war 
history, a treaty which really opens the door to the political and economic 
environment o f democratic Europe",50 and at a dinner for Chancellor Kohl in 
February 1992 Havel put a date on his membership wish, saying that he hoped 
that Czechoslovakia would join the EC at the latest by the end of the decade.51 
Within two years the EC had moved from the periphery to the centre of Havel’s
46 Shromazdeni o evropske konfederaci, Praha 12.6.1991; speech printed in Havel (1992), 
p.86-92, quotations from p.91. See also Dinan (1994), p.477 on Mitterrand's ambitions with 
the proposal.
47 Quoted from Havel (1997b), p.43. The English translation wrongly refers to the EC after the 
initial “European Economic Community", but in Havel’s Czech original one only finds the 
EEC (“EHS”): see Havel (1990), p.126'
48 Havel (1992). p.51 f, p.63.
44 Rada Ministrd NATO, 21.3.1991; speech printed in Havel (1992), pp.70-76, see especially 
p.74. Addressing his home audience in Summer Meditations in 1991 he said that 
Czechoslovakia had a very long way to go before obtaining full membership, but he also 
suggested that the EC might facilitate the process by offering some kind of associate 
membership. See Havel (1991b), p.66.
30Novorocni projev, 1.1.1992; speech printed in Havel (1992), pp.133-140, quotation from 
p. 137f.




























































































considerations about European unity, and Czechoslovak membership had become 
a specific wish.
In his speeches Havel was mostly positive, convinced that “good will” 
would overcome the difficulties that prevented the immediate realisation of his 
goals. He perceived of these goals in non-conflictual terms as "natural” 
realisations of a self-evident good. Terminologically, one notices that Havel in 
the future oriented, optimistic parts of his speeches always referred to "Europe” 
rather than "the West”. He called his own region “central Europe"?~ or more 
frequently “central and eastern Europe”, never “eastern Europe” or “the East”, 
and placed it next to "democratic western Europe”. In the early speeches "the 
West” occurred only once, in the Polish Sejm where Havel said with a touch of 
criticism: “We have awakened, and now we must arouse those in the West who 
have slept through our awakening. ”5'f This was an indication of what was to 
become a pattern: when Havel had to criticise he turned to the old confrontational 
terms of “West” and eventually even “East”.34
At the conference on European Confederation in 1991 Havel described the 
problems of the “post-communist countries” and their fight to join the “advanced 
West”. He characterised the attitude of this “West” as a highly ambiguous mixture 
of feelings of co-responsibility and caution, of “the will to [give] a courageous 
answer to the surprisingly fast changes in the East [and] a relying upon old 
stereotypes and a very modest wish to change too fast what has been created for 
decades and what has proved its worth in the free world”. In this speech he also 
for the first time supplemented his appeals to the good will of “democratic 
western Europe” with a “horror scenario”:
“I also think that it would be deeply unjust and that it might even have very pernicious 
consequences fo r the stability in all o f Europe i f  the emergence o f a European 
confederation would in any way curb the approximation o f the new central and eastern 
European democracies to the European Community. An artificially delayed or 
hampered economic reform in these countries could easily lead to a great social and *534
32 In the Sejm he said that “We have an opportunity to transform Central Europe from what 
has been a mainly historical and spiritual phenomenon into a political phenomenon”, Havel 
(1990), p.43. English translation from
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/2501.htnd>.
53 Quotations from Havel (1990), p.43 and 44; English translation from
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/ Havel/speeches/1990/2501 ,html>.
54 T.G. Ash has discovered a similar “semantic division of labour” in Havel’s pre-1989 
writings, Ash (1989), p. 183 f. See also Wolff (1994) for a brilliant study of the genesis of a 
“western” discourse on “eastern Europe”, and Jahn (1990) on the contemporary resistance to 
the concept in the region.




























































































political instability, which in the end necessarily would destabilise all o f Europe. ...Ml
At the CSCE Summit in July he again warned “the West” that it would be “in its 
own interests" to live up to the “historic challenge" of the time: “Confronted with 
the Eastern dramas, the West seems to be losing the certainty from which it has 
so far derived its common course. This is understandable: the West and the East 
are communicating vessels, and whatever happens in one o f them inevitably 
affects the other.”1'1
So eventually Havel’s discourse of a “natural” new Pan-European order 
with a harmoniously integrating Czechoslovakia crackled and collided with a 
reemerging older discourse of confrontation between an “advanced” West and a 
"problematic” East, in which a certain scepticism towards the intentions of “the 
West” became more and more visible. As Havel had problems offering political 
(rather than moral) arguments for western European engagement in central and 
eastern Europe, he also resorted to appeals to a “negative” western self-interest, 
threatening that a collapsing East would drag the West with it into the abyss.
4.1.3. New Developments 1993-1998
Havel’s authority and political weight may have diminished somewhat in his new 
office as Czech president, especially perhaps in the first years after the division 
of Czechoslovakia when prime minister Vaclav Klaus strove very hard to 
dominate the Czech political scene. The international interest in Havel may also 
have lessened somewhat as the “novelty” of the post-1989 actors abated, but 
Havel has remained a prolific commentator of international affairs and a central 
spokesman for his country. His basic views on Europe and the EU position had 
been established, but five new aspects of his thinking deserve mentioning.
First, Havel more and more explicitly defined Russia as a "Euro-Asian power ” 
juxtaposed to what was now increasingly called the “Euro-Atlantic” or the “Euro- 
American” civilisation.78 Unlike Huntington (to whose “clash of civilisations” 
Havel referred in a speech in Vilnius in 1996), Havel believed in the peaceful co­
operation of different “spheres of civilisation" within a larger global civilisation, 
but he was still preoccupied with defining civilisational borders, and in particular 
with avoiding "the existence of zones o f states that are unsure o f where they 5678*
56 Havel (1992), p.91.
57 Havel (1992), p. 195; English translation from: 
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1992/0907. html>.
58 Havel also uses concepts such as “European civilisation”, “the classical European west” or
even “Western European” and “Central Asian” spheres of civilisation. See the article ‘The Co- 





























































































Havel’s criteria for placing nations within civilisations were ambiguous. 
He oscillated between a “subjective” approach to identity, and an “objective” 
determination based on historical references. Thus he once said that “everyone 
should enjoy the inalienable right to say for himself where he sees his deepest 
roots and where he considers himself to belong in terms o f his cultural and 
historical links, his background and the values he may share with others ”.60 And 
then, for example, in a speech in Kiev, he declared that “Not only geographically, 
but also because o f its whole past history and the values it now embraces with an 
ever greater emphasis, Ukraine is a thoroughly European nation."6'
When Russia was brought up there was no such oscillation. In Vilnius 
Havel warned against isolating Russia from Europe; but when he said that 
“Russia, for its part, is a huge Euro-Asian power with a great gravitational 
potential o f its own; it has the right to maintain its own identity ”, this was only 
the right to maintain the “Euro-Asian” identity that Havel had already metered out 
for it.62 The unequivocal message of from Havel’s speeches since 1993 has 
therefore been the inclusion of America and the exclusion of Russia from “our” 
civilisation, with all it implied of recommendations for the political organisation 
of Europe.
Secondly, Havel vehemently rejected the principle of ethnically defined 
nation states and pointed at European integration as the best way to overcome the
belong”.59
b> The full quotation sounds: “World peace is hardly conceivable without good cooperation 
between the Euro-Atlantic region and this large and influential Euro-Asian entity. Yet, these 
two entities can cooperate creatively and build a deepening partnership only if both are clearly 
defined, have distinct boundaries and fully respect each other's identity. Unclear regional 
boundaries, or the existence of zones of states that are unsure of where they belong, always 
lead to trouble.” Mezinarodm konference NATO, Warsaw 21.6.1996, speech printed in Havel 
(1997a), pp.70-74, quotation from p.73. English translation from: 
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Huvel/speeches/1996/2106.html>.
60 Said about Lithuania and its wish to join NATO and repeated in 1997 about Ukraine. Cestny 
doktorat Vilniuske univerzity 17.4.1996, speech printed in Havel (1997a), pp.40-51, quotation 
from p.48 f. English translation from:
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1996/1704.html>.
61 Taras Shevchenko National University 1.7.1997. Speech found in English translation at
<http://www.hrad.cz/presidenl/Havel/speeches/1997/0107.html>. 
b~ Havel (1997a). p.50. English translation from:
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1996/2106.html>. In Kiev, Havel mentions 
how Ukraine finds itself in the “gravitational fields" o f “the Euro-American world' and on 
the other hand “the Russian Federation, which has always been and will remain a big Euro- 




























































































dangers of nationalism.6’ In his New Year's Address on 1 January 1994 Havel 
warned against seeing the new Czech state as “the mere pinnacle o f the nation .v 
being". He brought up Yugoslavia and juxtaposed a “programmatically national” 
principle of statehood to one founded on the “civic principle”, linking the latter 
to civil society and European integration. Unification would not, he claimed, 
bring “all European nations, ethnic groups, cultures and regions to merge into 
some amorphous pan-European sea, nor is it to create a kind o f monstrous 
s u p e r s ta te Instead, Havel insisted, “the many different civil societies in the 
democratic European countries will, together, create the great European civil 
society. 1 see no other and no better possibility for us than to accept the spirit of 
a civic Europe. ”* 64 Havel could therefore tell the European Parliament in March 
1994 that "we are able and happy to surrender a portion o f our sovereignty in 
favour o f the commonly administered sovereignty’ o f the European Union, 
because we know it will repay us many times over, as it will all Europeans .”65 6
In the same spirit he insisted on central European co-operation, as when 
hosting a meeting of the presidents of Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia in Litomysl in April 1994. Explaining the significance of 
the meeting to the Czech public (Klaus had notably excused himself from the 
official dinner), Havel called it proof that central Europe was still alive in the 
minds of the central Europeans. Also, he said, the presence of the German and 
Austrian presidents demonstrated that central Europe was an integral part of the 
Europe “which is somewhat imprecisely called western Europe or the West". He 
added also that everybody believed in and wanted a "democratic and truly 
European Germany. ”6b
Thirdly, Havel combined his critique of nationalism with an extended 
narrative on European history. Europe was not just a civilisational and cultural 
entity, he claimed: "Europe has always been and still is in essence one single and
6> At the CSCE Summit in Vienna, 8 October 1993 he said: “The greatness of the idea of 
European integration on democratic foundations consists in its capacity to overcome the old 
Herderian idea of the nation-state as the highest expression of national life. Thus, European 
integration should - and must, if it is to succeed - enable all the nationalities to realize their 
national autonomy within the framework of a broad civil society created by the supranational 
community.” Printed in Havel (1997b), pp. 128-133, quotation on p.130.
64 Novorocm projev 1.1.1994, printed in Havel (1995), pp.8-17, quotations from p. 14 ff. 
English translation from Havel (1997b), p.150.
65 Evropsky parlament, speech printed in Havel (1995), pp.54-64, quotation on p.58.
66 Litomyslske znaky, Lidove noviny 28.4.1994, printed in Havel (1995), pp.74-81, quotations 
from p.75 and p.78. Havel also brought up the classical image of central Europe as a bridge, 
when stating that the sooner the central Europeans cultivated the European values of tolerance 
and solidarity among themselves, the sooner these ideas could spread further "to the south and 




























































































indivisible political entity, though immensely diverse, multifaceted and intricately 
structured".67 To him, European history was essentially one big attempt to shape 
this structure and define the relations between its parts. Hitherto, however, the 
result had mostly been an order built on, and consequently overthrown by force. 
According to Havel, the driving idea behind the EU was a “magnanimous 
attempt" to give Europe an order based on democracy, peace and co-operation, 
and now Europe had a historical chance to extend this principle to the whole 
continent. Havel interpreted all tensions in Europe after 1989 as a struggle 
between the democratic principle (the idea of the EU) and the anti-democratic 
principle of nationalism and authoritarianism,68 and when thanking the European 
Council in Luxemburg on 13 December 1997 for the invitation to the Czech 
Republic to join the EU membership talks he repeated this vision of European 
history calling present developments “a great victory for the 'European spirit. ’”69
Fourthly, Havel was increasingly specific in his evaluation of the EU. 
Having embedded the EU as a key positive actor in a greater narrative of the 
European battle between good and evil, he kept measuring actual EU 
performance in this light. Speaking to the European Parliament in March 1994 he 
praised the Maastricht Treaty as a great “technical” achievement which however 
left him with a feeling of want. The EU did have a spirit or an ethos, he was 
convinced, but it had become invisible behind the technicalities and petty argu­
ments about rules and regulations. To win over people, Havel claimed, the EU 
must “impress upon millions o f European souls an idea, a historical mission and 
a momentum. It must clearly articulate the values upon which it is founded and 
which it intends to defend and cultivate. It also must take care to create emblems 
and symbols, visible bearers o f its significance",70 In short, it must conduct a
67 Cena Karla Velikeho, Aachen 15.5.1996, speech printed in Havel (1997a), pp.52-61, 
quotation on p.56, English translation from: 
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1996/1505.html>.
08 Havel presented this interpretation both at home and abroad, most consistently perhaps in 
his speech to the European Parliament in March 1994, see Havel (1995), p.54 ff. He repeated 
it in Aachen in 1996, but with a more explicit warning to the EU about the danger of 
hesitation: “unless democrats proceed in a timely manner to build the internal structure o f 
Europe as a single political entity, others will start building it their way - and the democrats 
could be left with only their eyes to cry with. The demons that so fatally affected European 
history - most disastrously in the twentieth century! - are biding their lime." (See note 69, 
quotation from p.57). Havel’s ideas seem very much inspired by the first Czechoslovak 
president T.G.Masaryk’s interpretation of world history as a struggle between the principle of 
“democracy” and that of “theocracy” or authoritarianism, culminating in the First World War 
and the following creation of democratic nation-states in east central Europe.
69 Speech found in English translation at:
<http://www. It rad. cz/president/Havel/speeches/1997/1312. html>.




























































































conscious, active “identity politics” similar to nation building. Havel also asked 
from the EU a clear commitment to enlargement, including a specific timetable 
for all of Europe not yet included.77
Presented like this, obligations are stronger on the EU than on the 
applicant side in the sense that enlargement is justified by history and culture as 
such, by Europe’s civilisational unity, before any specific political or economic 
criteria enter the game (to be precise, these criteria are not seen as irrelevant or 
unjust, only as secondary). Therefore, especially in an international context, 
Havel paid relatively little attention to what the Czechs had to do or live up to.* 712 *
Finally, Havel’s scepticism towards western Europe did not disappear. The 
threat to Europe came not only from nationalists, but also from “the weakness and 
indifference on the part o f the democrats”13, he said in Holland in 1995, and the 
following year he told the Czech Parliament that “the danger o f ‘Munich-ism ’ is 
taking wings again over Europe. ”74 Havel kept warning that it would be naive
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1994/ 0803.html>. Ironically, the EC had 
especially since the mid-1980’s invested a lot in this kind of “identity politics”, complete with 
flag, hymn and history books, with very poor results. See Boxhoom (1996) and Smith (1992).
71 He did acknowledge in Strasbourg 1994 that “It is clear that new members, particularly 
those attempting to shed the consequences o f Communist rule, cannot be accepted overnight 
into the European Union without seriously threatening to tear the delicate threads from which 
it is woven" Havel (1995), p.59. English translation from:
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1994/0803.html>. See also Havel’s speech in 
Aachen, Havel (1997a), especially p.57.
72 Addressing his own nation, Havel has at times stressed also the Czech obligation to prepare 
for membership of the EU legally and economically and not the least by “cultivating 
Europeanness”. See his New Year’s Address 1 January 1995, printed in Havel (1995), pp.192- 
204, especially p.202. In his big speech to the Parliament on 9 December 1997 - during the 
government crisis that lead to the resignation of Klaus - Havel criticised the “pride, 
provincialism and parochialism” that had led his government to disrupt the Visegrad co­
operation and neglect the task of explaining to the citizens the historic importance of 
membership of the EU and NATO. Preparation was thus again interpreted mostly in moral and 
educational terms, whereas the long parts of the speech dealing with the necessity of reforms 
in the economy, the legal sphere, public administration, self-government, etc., does not relate 
the wished-for policy reforms to the question of living up to EU requirements. English 
translation of the speech from:
<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1997/0912.html>.
11 The 1995 Geuzenpenning, Vlaardingen, 13.3.1995, speech printed in Havel (1997b), 
pp.188-192, quotation from p. 191.
74 “..mnichovanske nebezpeci se opet nad Evropou vzndsl.” Speech printed in Havel (1997a), 
pp.26-39, quotation from p.38. The reference is to the appeasement politics of the Munich 






























































































“believe that one half o f Europe will blossom, will be able to protect itself from  
different dangers and cooperate along democratic principles and that the other half 
o f Europe will forever find itself in some indeterminate vacuum... It is now six years 
ago that the Iron Curtain fell. I feel that relatively little has happened in these years. 
And time is working against the democrats.”15
Behind the strong words, however, Havel’s warnings and frustrations can be seen 
as indications of the weakness of the Czech position vis-à-vis the EU and of 
Havel’s difficulties with constructing a narrative capable of convincing first of 
all western European decision-makers about the necessity of enlargement.
4.2. The Government and the Prime Minister
The government has the main responsibility not only for the daily conduct of the 
country’s foreign affairs, but also for determining its foreign policy priorities. 
Government statements and articles and speeches by leading ministers thus all 
create a narrative framework that can make these policies meaningful to the 
Czech population and to the surrounding world. This narrative will be studied 
here primarily in Klaus’s rendering, with a special attention to how it corresponds 
to that of Havel, and to how it reflected the government change of policy in 1995- 
1996.
4.2.1. The Foreign Policy Statement of April 1993
In the first years after the split of Czechoslovakia the government approach to 
foreign politics may be characterised as solitary and self-conscious. This is 
already apparent in the first major official foreign policy statement from April 
1993 when Josef Zieleniec presented the government’s concept of a new Czech 
foreign policy to the parliament.* 76
°  Projev na slavnostm'm zahâjem kongresu Nové atlantické iniciativy 10.5.1996, printed in 
Stredni Evropa 61/1996., pp.77-80, quotation on p.79.
76 The policy statement of the Czech government from 13 July 1992 contains only four short 
paragraphs on foreign politics, primarily because this still fell within the competence of the 
Federal government. The wish to strengthen relations to the EC was mentioned briefly in the 
third paragraph, and most attention w'as given to the protection of national interests from the 





























































































As its starting point the government took a very positive view on the 
implications of the division of Czechoslovakia. Geopolitically, it claimed, the 
Czech Republic had emancipated itself from the part of the Danube area that 
bordered at “the unstable zones of eastern and south-eastern Europe”. This 
would gain importance as the Czech Republic became a part of the "zone of 
stability in western Europe” to which the country was “predetermined by its 
history, geographical location, tradition o f political democracy and effort to 
create a civic state under the rule of law, respecting human rights”,71 i.e. by both 
history and by its own present and future efforts.
The goal of Czech foreign politics was to secure the stability, security and 
economic prosperity of the country and its position "in the family o f European 
democratic countries”. To obtain this, the Czech Republic had to create good 
relations to its neighbours and to work on the gradual integration of the country 
into the “main European economic, political and defence organisations”, and 
finally to ‘ follow events in eastern and south-eastern Europe and maintain 
contacts with the countries o f the post-communist world’. This ranking of 
neighbours before international organisations was followed by an account of 
bilateral and multilateral priorities with a clear emphasis on the former. And when 
turning to multilateral priorities Zieleniec started with the significance of 
integrating into the world economy (including institutions such as the EC, the 
IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, OECD and GATT) before specifying priorities 
vis-à-vis the EC.
EC membership was defined as a "long term goal and a clear priority'”, 
and to prepare for a ‘ fast and smooth” accession the Czech Republic would have 
to harmonise its legislation and create a free-trade zone. Integration was, the 
government acknowledged, first of all a domestic challenge, but:
"on the other hand, the fall o f the Iron Curtain is not a challenge only to 
us. Also the nations o f western Europe have gradually to get used to the 
thought that we will one day live together. The European Community, to 
a large extent a product of the former bipolar world, must find its new 
place in the new world, must find its new vision. An effort to adapt the 
economy must be exerted on both sides o f the former Iron Curtain. It is 
obvious that even the economy o f the countries o f the European 78
77 Zieleniec, Josef: Ke koncepci zahranicni politiky Ceske republiky, 21.4.1993, printed in 
Kotyk (1997), pp.243-250, quotations from p.243 (=Zieleniec 1993).
78 Zieleniec (1993), p.244. The emphasis on the distance to these countries is obvious and the 





























































































Community as a consequence of the integration o f our countries must 
undergo a process o f restructuring, which is also not going to be 
painless"19.
In 1993 the government thus felt confident enough to tell the EC how to behave 
and what to expect while taking its willingness to enlarge for granted. 
Furthermore, it presented enlargement as basically making equal demands on 
equal partners, rather than as a adaptation of Czech standards to a given EC/EU 
norm.
4.2.2. Vaclav Klaus 1993-1995
In this period Vaclav Klaus further developed a self-confident discourse. In 
addition to political speeches at home and abroad Klaus also regularly wrote 
small essays to the daily newspaper Lidove noviny. From these statements four 
main themes may be identified: his vision of Europe, his vision of the Czech 
nation, his interpretation of the EC/EU and finally his view on their mutual 
relationship.
Klaus’ basic premise is the observation that “Europe can never be 
enlarged (or narrowed) by anybody. Europe is Europe no matter which 
institutions emerge in it" and that “the Czech lands have always been a part of 
Europe". Terminologically Klaus keeps to “Europe”, avoiding Havel’s “Euro- 
American civilisation” and using “the West” only rarely (and then with “western 
Europe” as a sub-category). Speaking to the Council of Europe in 1995 he said 
that he believed in Europe as “more than the sum o f its parts” and as "a very real 
thing", even without the “tangible institutions” that “some” (a hint at Euro­
federalists) preferred to build in order to make Europe visible.79 801 “Europe” 
generally appeared in Klaus’s speeches as a given entity and, unlike Havel, he 
devoted relatively little energy to defining its substance82 or its borders.83
79 Zieleniec (1993), p.249. One notices that in this somewhat confrontational context, the 
Czech Republic is not placed among the "nations of western Europe”. Havel’s speeches 
contained a similar ambiguity in the use of the “western” predicate.
80 Evropa v perspektive setkani v Davosu, Lidove noviny 7.2.1994, printed in Klaus (1994), 
pp. 166-168, quotations from p. 166 and 167.
81 Evropa, nase vize a nase strategic, Strasbourg 30.1.1995, printed in Klaus (1995), pp. 141 - 
145, quotations from p.144 and 145.
82 Speaking in Bavaria in 1993 he once referred to “western Christendom, which - together 
with eastern Christendom - became the foundation stone o f European civilisation" (Zmeny v 
Praze a evropske souvislosti, 22.3.1993, printed in Klaus (1994), pp.131-137, quotation from 
p. 131) and in his speech in Strasbourg (see note 84) he listed “the natural attraction o f Europe 




























































































There is, however, one substantial terminological ambiguity in Klaus's 
writings. Most of the time Klaus stuck to the notion of “one Europe”, and he 
spoke with sarcasm about a “western Europe that likes to call itself Europe" 
which often reminded him of a hotel room with a “Do not disturb” sign on the 
door83 4. But when he said in Bavaria in 1993 that "if we want to live in European 
contexts we must, after forty years o f separation, Europeanise ourselves 
internally and also in our foreign politics’\ 85 he clearly referred to “European” 
and “Europeanise” as western European norms for economic and political life.
When Klaus mentions the Czech wish to become part of "advanced 
Europe", he does recognise the difference between a western and an eastern 
Europe (a concept he is less afraid of than Havel).86 87When he writes that "Europe 
should strive to contribute to the integration and inner stability o f the countries 
o f the former eastern bloc"?1 “Europe” as an acting subject can hardly mean 
anything but western Europe or the EU. Similarly, his declaration that "In... [four 
years since 1989] we have resisted the recommendation o f some o f our western 
friends to form in central and eastern Europe some special, sub-regional 
institution, because this would only separate us from Europe, not unite us with 
it”ss makes no sense by Klaus’s own definition of Europe, while it is perfectly 
logical if “Europe” means the EU.
as starting points for European integration (op.cit. p. 145).
83 Perhaps also because he hardly ever mentioned countries to the east of his own. In a single 
reference to Russia he places the country1 outside Europe, although more, it seems, for political 
than for historical or cultural reasons: “Europe and the world should not close themselves 
before [Russia], they should not isolate it, although they on no account must offer it 
membership o f such exclusive 'clubs' as NATO or the European Union. Ten years is too little 
to realise a consistent transformation o f such a country." Deset let “perestrojky”, Lidové 
noviny 6.3.1995, p.5.
84 V pfedvecer kodanské schùzky, Lidové noviny 14.3.1993, printed in Klaus (1994), p.147- 
148.
85 Klaus (1994), p.132
86 Klaus (1994), p. 153. Sometimes Klaus uses the official, "politically correct” central and 
eastern Europe, but just as often he has the “traditional” eastern Europe in which he doesn’t 
hesitate to include his own country; see for instance Klaus (1994), p. 136, where both concepts 
are used.
87 Klaus (1994), p.137.
88 Ceska republika ajejf integrace do evropskych politickych, bezbecnostnich a ekonomickych 
struktur, speech in Prague, printed in Klaus (1995), p. 121-123, quotation from p. 123. German 
version, Die Tschechische Republik und die Integration Europas in Europaische Rundschau 
3/94, pp.3-5. Klaus here explicitly rejects the idea of Visegràd co-operation and even the term 
itself. See also the article Stredoevropské inicrativy, Lidové noviny 9.5.1994, printed in Klaus 
(1995), pp.128-129, in which Klaus gives his account of what “central-europeanness” means 




























































































Like Havel, Klaus has a model for the interpretation of European history. 
His starting point is the characterisation of Europe as an entity “based on a 
distinct heterogeneity which creates a very’ fragile balance”.89 Whereas in 
Havel’s vision a dynamism arose from the struggle between the organising 
principles of force or co-operation, authoritarianism or democracy, nationalism 
or civil society, Klaus found the motor of development in the tension between 
“unifying, pan-European tendencies on the one hand and individualising, more 
national strivings on the other”, This conflict or strife, he claimed, "is as old as 
Europe itself' and it would be naive to think that it could be overcome in the 
1990’s. Quoting Masaryk, he described it as a task for Europe to create harmony 
between these centralising and autonomising forces.90 While insisting that 
“Europe in its very’ substance is a 'multi-speed' continent" and that both division 
or fragmentation and forced unification (as with Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin) 
were bad for Europe91, most of his warnings were directed against unification. 
A European Union based on unification was either a utopian dream or, in its 
“Napoleonic version”, a great power attempt at European hegemony92, he 
claimed. When introducing the tension between unifying and individualising 
principles, he continued the list with oppositions of protectionism and free 
market, statism and liberalism, dogma and common sense, lies and truth, while 
making it very clear that the adherents of a “pan-European government, pan- 
European currency, pan-European standard for the shape and size of bottles o f 
beer or wine, a common European citizenship, a common European social 
legislation and such things ”93 belonged on the side of the former.
Klaus’s negative view of European unification was closely related to his 
view of the nation. Klaus persisted that a “national feeling” was legitimate, that 
“the whole idea o f Europe should not be based on a too simplistic rejection of 
patriotism and national feeling", and that attempts to base European integration
89 Klaus (1995), p.141.
‘,IJ Evropske zudrhele a maso, Lidove noviny 19.4.1993, printed in Klaus (1994), pp.53-54, 
quotations and reference to Masaryk on p.53. It is worth noticing that both Havel (see note 70) 
and Klaus go back to Masaryk to bolster or legitimise their argument. Although they reach 
very different conclusions, their claims to Masaryk are in a certain sense justified, since they 
focus on two different and not always fully compatible sides of his philosophy of European 
history (see Bugge 1997).
91 Vicerychlostm' Evropa, Lidove noviny 19.9.1994, printed in Klaus (1995), pp.136-138, 
quotation from p. 136.
92 PrekroSili jsme Rubikon, speech in Felfading, Germany 3.12.1993, printed in Klaus (1994), 
pp. 162-165, quotations on p. 165. Here he also said that “Europe when it was not fatally 
divided, always formed a unity in diversity".
93 Klaus (1994), p.53 f. Accordingly, he warned against making Europe stronger or bigger only 
to be able to compete with the USA or with Japan, since “we don't believe in size”. Klaus 




























































































on a “European feeling” superior to national identity would turn out to be an 
artificial, bureaucratic super-nationalism imposed from above94: "it is already 
clear now that different Europeans will not seek their identity' in a Europe totally 
without borders, but on the contrary with the help o f them. It is borders or clear 
demarcations that give us a clear identity. ”95
To Klaus, the natural unit for self-determination is the sovereign nation 
state.96 Klaus is full of praise for the British conservatives, whom he calls 
“constructive euro-realists", with whom the Czechs are "in the same boat”, and 
he joins John Major in saying that the EC must remain a union of sovereign 
nation states97. Klaus is convinced that the overwhelming majority of Europeans 
will accept European integration only if the nation state remains the primary unit 
and the European supra-national institutions secondary. The debate about integra­
tion can then focus on what and how much to transfer to the supra-national level, 
but not on the hierarchy of institutions as such98. In the same vein Klaus strongly 
rejects regionalism as simply the flip side of European unification or 
fédéralisation. He quotes Margaret Thatcher for saying that "you cannot 
cantonize the world", and calls plans for central European regionalism utopian 
projects designed to challenge the existing nation states. He also attacks the 
thought that Europe and its regions are “natural units”, and the creation of nation 
states two hundred years ago a mere “historical blunder”.99
94 Ceskâ republika a mySlenka evropské integrace, speech in Prague 21.12.1993, pnnted in 
Klaus (1994), pp.149-154, see especially p.150. See further Klaus (1995), p. 123 (for the 
quotation), and Klaus (1995), p. 145.
93 Nerozpustit se v evropeismu, speech in Frankfurt 18.1.1993, printed in Klaus (1994), 
pp. 138-140, quotation on p. 139 f. It is interesting to compare with Havel who, though adherent 
of a Europe where borders lose their importance, are equally eager to define such borders or 
demarcations, only around Europe rather than within it. See above p. 19.
% In Lidové noviny Klaus wrote on 17 February 1996: "It is our duty to give our country to our 
children at least in the shape in which we got it from our parents. Not a single square metre 
smaller, not a bit less sovereign. And no negative change in this direction may follow form the 
present Czech-German discussions, nor from today's at times somewhat simplified pan- 
European unionist plans." ("Podivnâ demagogickà aktivita CSSD”). It was said in the heat of 
the moment, w'hen the Klaus government was exposed to populist attacks from the Social 
Democrats and others of selling out of Czech national interests to the Germans, but if the 
statement on sovereignty is taken literally, Klaus here comes close to contradicting the official 
policy of his own government, as well as the obligations accepted by it with the signing of the 
“Europe agreement” with the EU.
97 John Major o Evropë, Lidové noviny, 26.9.1993, pnnted in Klaus (1994), p.143-144.
98 Klaus (1995), p. 136. Klaus here uses the phrase "the European states (states who are mostly 
national)", which suggest an "ethnic” rather than a “civic” or “political” definition of the 
nation state.
99 Jami Anglie, Lidové noviny, 21.3.1994, printed in Klaus (1995), pp.124-125, quotation on 




























































































All this allowed Klaus to identify the central political challenge for the 
Czechs in their relationship to Europe/the EU as follows: “The Czech Republic 
is facing one important task: how to be European without at the same time 
dissolving in Europeanness like a lump o f sugar in a cup o f coffee"'00 or, with a 
metaphor that nicely spells out the “fatal attraction” of (western) Europe to the 
Czech eye: “[we] stand before a double task: to find our own identity and not to 
lose it again immediately on our way to Europe. ”WI This, he continues, is the 
reason why the Czechs prefer the integration of European states and nations 
before unification or federalism.
This crucial statement reveals a basic uncertainty and defensiveness about 
the Czech position, visible also in Havel’s reasoning. Perhaps this uncertainty 
may explain Klaus’s urge to present his own vision of how to organise Europe, 
and why he tries to bolster the Czech self-assurance by stressing (like Havel in 
his dissident years) that the Czechs, and other former communist nations, have 
a special sensitivity towards phenomena such as centralisation and the 
bureaucratic repression of difference, which present a real danger to Europe.10' 
Klaus’s perception of the EC/EU is of course deeply affected by his economic 
philosophy, his interpretation of European history and his belief in the 
irreplaceable role of the nation state. He has, however, two rather conflicting 
interpretations of EC/EU history that share only their rejection of Maastricht 
Treaty EU.
In his first account, he portrays the present version of European integration 
as founded on ideological paradigms from the first two-thirds of the twentieth 
century, characterised by a distrust of a spontaneously working free market and 
a belief in size, unification, planning and state intervention. These paradigms 
(which also took the division of Europe for granted) gave birth to the Maastricht 
project, which however in Klaus’s opinion increasingly appears as outdated, both 
practically - it is seen as a main cause of western Europe’s economic problems 
and of its protectionist stance vis-à-vis eastern Europe - and theoretically, since 
the new. liberalist paradigms of the 1980’s (which Klaus embrace) are beginning 
to assert themselves in politics. Therefore, Klaus predicts, the EU will change 
towards deregulation and economic openness, towards “a belief in the market and 
not in the state".* 101 102
1(10 Klaus (1994). p. 136. Klaus has defined Czech “Europeanism” (“evropanismus”) as the 
“duty to guard and protect our own identity, traditions and habits, because we believe that this 
is precisely what we can offer each o f you in Europe". Klaus (1995), p. 141.
101 Klaus (1994), p.153 and with nearly identical words in Klaus (1995), p.122. In both cases 
italicized in the original. Klaus here calls this a task for all post-communist countries.
102 Klaus (1994), p.154 and 168.




























































































In this “optimistic” scenario, Maastricht is the swan song of an old EC 
philosophy. But Klaus also has a different version, which evaluates the "original 
vision” of the EC far more positively, while seeing the Maastricht Treaty as the 
first omen of something new and threatening:
“The original vision started from the necessity to prevent a repetition o f the Second 
World War, to integrate Germany into Europe in a new fashion, to support the values 
o f freedom and democracy against communist ideology, to support the growth in 
wealth by removing barriers to trade and creating a common market
This vision, which according to Klaus had the support of most citizens of Europe, 
is however:
“in all silence being replaced by a far more comprehensive vision, consisting in Euro- 
peanism, in the effort to create a new European identity, in a greater co-ordination 
from the centre, in the attuning o f economic policies, in joint programmes in many 
areas, in a belief in extensive regulation, in the diminishing o f the authority and re­
sponsibility o f the nations or states,” * 104
This contradiction may be explained as a wavering between hopes and fears about 
future EU developments, but it also reveals an ambiguity in Klaus’s perception 
of the value of the EU. In the second version he clearly recognises the political 
value of the EC/EU project, while elsewhere he seems to deny it any value at all: 
“the success of western Europe depended not on the institutions of the European 
Community, but on a free society, private ownership and a free market”.105 Klaus 
insists that the European institutions are only means, not goals in their own right, 
and that as such they make sense only if they support free trade and a free 
market.106
One may wonder why at all Klaus wants his country to become member of the 
EU, since he is so critical of its present shape. His answer is held in very general
interview from January 1996 Klaus even brings up the theory that a change of generations in 
the EU bureaucracy will pave the way for the “intellectual revolution” of the 1980s: “There 
will no longer be the civil servants o f which a significant part founded the EEC in the fifties 
and still sit there since these days”, Ziti na hrane je tezke - rozhovor Ekonoma, Ekonom 
1/1996, pp.l 1-13, quotation from p. 12.
104 Klaus (1995), p.144
105 Klaus (1994), p. 166. Elsewhere, he is equally categorical as when claiming that “the 
success o f us in Europe, not o f Europe itself, depends on the quality and structure o f the 
general political, social and economic system that functions here, and not on the existence, 
extent o f operation and activities o f multilateral European institutions", Klaus (1995), p. 122.




























































































terms that “we do not want to miss the advantages that come from the 
membership of European institutions [and] we share the European values o f our 
western neighbours” and that therefore the Czechs want to “join a reasonable 
European integration ”.107 Klaus did not spell out the advantages or the values 
very clearly, except that "reasonable” obviously referred to an international co­
operation based on economic liberalism. It was this reduction of “the idea of the 
EC/EU” to free trade and open markets that allowed Klaus to declare his country' 
ready before the EU would be* 108, and to demand from the EU not just “a realistic 
time schedule for important integration steps, but first o f all a permanent, non- 
aprioristic search for the nature o f this integration itself \ 109
Similarly, Klaus was much in favour of a “multi-speed” Europe since it 
meant giving up the ambition to create one binding model for all and thus 
facilitated Czech integration into the EU. “Widening” rather than “deepening” 
was his priority, since, as he put it, it was easier to get on a slow train than on an 
express train. Thus his resistance to the Maastricht Treaty seems based also on a 
fear that the concentration on “internal affairs” might make the EU forget eastern 
Europe110. Like Havel, however, Klaus had difficulties bringing concrete 
arguments for why the EU should enlarge (although unlike Havel he was 
reluctant to bring threats), and he too resorts to moralistic appeals to the 
“Europeanness” of western Europe and to everybody’s responsibility to “heal the 
un-organic wound between the West and the East o f this continent".111
4.2.3. Government Attitudes since the Application for Membership
Against this background of praise for the sovereign nation state and scepticism 
of the EU, the official Memorandum that accompanied the Government’s 
application for membership of the EU in January 1996 reads not just like a
l0' Klaus (1995), p. 121, emphasis added in the second quotation. See also Klaus (1994), p. 167.
108 “We want to become a part of advanced Europe and lam  convinced, that we have the basic 
preconditions fo r it, probably better than anybody else" Klaus (1994), p. 153. See also above 
p.5.
109 Klaus (1994), p.154. Or elsewhere: “The idea that the post-communist countries will 
gradually “europeanise” and the promise that they will gradually be integrated into an 
unchanged western Europe is insufficient and basically wrong”. Klaus (1994), p.165
110 As he put it here “a deepening o f the European Union without us is not and cannot be a 
victory fo r  us" Klaus (1995), p. 138. Klaus is very morally upset about the Maastricht Treaty’s 
attempt to give full emphasis to deepening at the same time as the collapse of communism 
gave all of Europe a historic challenge and a historic chance. Therefore, he claims, after a 
period of awareness of their own weakness and of their bad conscience, the post-communist 
countries are fully entitled to criticise the protectionism and lack of openness in the West. 
Klaus (1994), p.148.




























































































change of attitude, but almost like a confession.112 134*The Memorandum contains an 
unequivocal acceptance of the EU in all its aspects, an explanation of why the 
Czech Republic wants to become a member and why it feels ready for such a step 
and, in the “confession” part, an account of the difficulties the government went 
through before coming to accept the EU.
As to acceptance, there is no trace of Klaus’s reservations in the statement 
that ‘'the Czech Republic accepts for its future membership the European Union 
such as it is and such as it will be shaped by the collective wisdom of its Member 
States in the months and years to come”, nor in the proclamation (after some 
words of praise for the inner market and the EMU) that “the Czech Government 
at the same time accepts the broader, non-economic aspects o f European integra­
tion”." 3 The Memorandum is very frank about the difficulties of the government 
in overcoming its mistrust towards the “complicated and at times not sufficiently 
transparent mechanism o f the EU”, 'U and in getting used to the perspective of 
giving up part of the country’s sovereignty.
The application for membership is described as “a step o f unparalleled 
importance in the modem history o f the country" that puts a great responsibility 
on the government, both toward its own citizens and toward all of Europe (the 
point that the government also wishes to join the EU for Europe’s sake is made 
twice in the document). The government has, however, come to the conviction
112 Memorandum k prihlaSce, Lidove noviny 20.10.1995, p.3. The basic draft was prepared in 
the Government Committee for European Integration and according to Klaus addressed both 
to a domestic and to a foreign audience. Klaus stressed that there was no “artificial division” 
between Euro-sceptics and Euro-optimists among the seven present ministers, in stark contrast 
to the general impression of the situation within the government, see Had et al. (1997), p.52.
113 Memorandum (1996). English translation from the home-page of the Czech Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: <http://www.czech.cz/english/132_eu.htm>. Interestingly, the English version 
is somewhat shorter than the Czech one. For example: Both versions have the sentence that 
“the Government o f the Czech Republic is aware o f the usefulness and irreversability o f the 
process o f European integration”, but in the English version the latter half of the sentence 
“and its unique actual expression in the concept o f institutions o f the European Union” is 
omitted. The domestic public is thus offered an even stronger praise of the EU than the foreign 
readership. In the following, the English translation will be used when the texts correspond, 
and information given when they do not.
114 The English rendering of the paragraph, from which the quotation is taken, is shorter than
the Czech original and reads: “It has not been easy to define the principles and the 
mechanisms o f the European Union. It has not been easy to overcome the notion o f mistrust 
in the face o f such a complicated entity as the European Union." In this case, the description 
and the critique of the complexity of the EU institutions in the Czech text has been subdued 




























































































that this responsibility “allows for no other a lternativesL\  which we may both 
read fatalistically - as a recognition of the untenability of Klaus’s position so far 
- and as an attempt to ward off any debate about the government’s decision. As 
Judy Batt has put it in a critique of Klaus’s arguments for his economic policies: 
“I f there is no alternative, however, there is no room for politics, which is all 
about free choice between competing alternatives.”116 Klaus has had difficulties 
in recognising this aspect of political life, both “theoretically”'117 *and in actual 
practice. According to the Memorandum the Czech government enjoys “broad 
support from the majority o f citizens and from the determining political forces in 
the country”.118 But the government totally abstained from consulting these 
political forces in the Czech parliament before submitting the application and the 
Memorandum to the EU.119
In the “historical” part of the text one finds the now familiar claims about 
the Czech Lands being, with the involuntary exception of the last decades, “a 
natural and conspicuous part o f the western European civilisational space", a 
space that promotes “identical civilisational and cultural values” and that to a 
great extent is “identical with the space o f today's E l f '.120 It also stresses that 
“Czech national identity was for most o f its history part o f multicultural entities”, 
which is said to increase the Czech understanding of the implications of European 
integration, while “dark periods with the baneful consequences o f disintegration 
and national egoism”121 are described as the negative side of this heritage. This 
is closer to Havel than to Klaus’s praise of the nation state. Finally, the Memo­
1,3 Or, in the English translation, “makes this decision imperative".
110 Batt (1994), p.40. Notice also the passage in the Memorandum that “the Government o f the 
Czech Republic has irrevocably arrived at the conclusion that within the context o f modem 
European developments the exchange o f a part o f its national sovereignty for a shared supra­
national sovereignty and co-responsibility is an inevitable step to be taken for the benefit o f 
its own country and the whole o f Europe" (emphasis added twice).
117 See Martinsen (1995) for a fine analysis of the “anti-political” ideology of Vaclav Klaus.
1!h This paragraph is omitted in the English version.
119 When blamed in Parliament by the Communist deputy Vaclav Exner for not presenting the 
question to the Parliament and allowing for a dicussion there, Klaus bluntly dismissed the 
critique claiming first, with a distortion of Exner’s argument, that nowhere in Europe had there 
been a referendum about the application for membership, and secondly that “there would be 
plenty o f time for us in this country to calmly discuss, in which form the consent o f the citizens 
to the entry into the EU can be realised” (sic!). 39. Schuze Poslanecke snemovny, 6 - 
21.3.1996, Bod XXXVIII: Ustm interpelace poslancu nacleny vlady, quoted from the home- 
page of the Czech Parliament:
<http://www.psp.cz/eklnh/1993ps/stenprot/039schuz/s039022.lum>.
120 This passage is omitted in the English version. The privileged position granted to Western 
Europe is remarkable.




























































































randum stresses the good Czech results in preparing for membership "both within 
and beyond the framework o f the Europe Agreement” and its conviction that the 
EU will soon be ready to respond positively to the Czech application.
In sum, the Memorandum reads like a fundamental revisal of many of Klaus’s 
viewpoints. It might suggest that Klaus had come to the conclusion that his old 
attitudes had been counterproductive, and that there - if membership were to 
remain a priority of Czech foreign policy - was “no alternative” to a change of 
style. But the swing may also very well stem from a difference of perception 
within the government, with “dissenting” voices eventually getting the upper 
hand.122
In interviews and articles in 1995 Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec 
presented an interpretation of the EU that clearly different from the one of Klaus. 
Zieleniec praised the political dimension of the EC/EU co-operation, especially 
its importance for the preservation of peace and prevention of “national wars” in 
Europe, which, he claimed, was also of paramount importance to the Czech 
Republic. Therefore Zieleniec saw “no alternative” to its “European fate". 
Similarly, he warned against letting economic calculations of wins and losses for 
different social groups or the response to the European social legislation 
determine the general attitude to Czech membership.123
Although stressing the global rather than the particular aspects of the 
Czech desire for membership, Zieleniec also made some more specific 
observations about Czech interests and positions towards the EU. Discussing the 
future shape of EU institutions he claimed that the Czechs after over forty years 
of uncontrolled bureaucratic rule put great emphasis on a balance between the 
executive and the legislative. In EU terms he “translated” this not to a call for in­
creased powers of the European Parliament, but to an emphasis on the importance 
of the member states and their parliaments for the control of the EU 
bureaucracy.124 He noticed that the Czech EU debate was only beginning and
According to Jin Pehe, Czech foreign policy in these years had three pronounced sources, 
the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose approach the EU 
and on Czech-German matters differed from that of Klaus, see Pehe (1998), p.63
123 Cerny, Adam & Jungrova, Terezie: Minulost nenf tezistem nasich vztahu s Nemeckem. 
interview with Josef Zieleniec, Lidove noviny 24.2.1995, p.8 (Zieleniec 1995a)
124 When asked if he agreed with Milan Uhde, Chairman of the Czech Parliament and like 
Zieleniec a leading member of the ODS (Civic Democratic Party), that the unification of 
Europe conducted by a supra-national bureaucracy would be a danger to the Czechs, Zieleniec 
replied that this was not a relevant way to put the question. A "United States of Europe” was 
clearly a utopian idea, and Zieleniec was convinced that the EU was aiming towards a Europe 
of nations, not towards a single European nation. But, he repeated, these nations would have 




























































































mentioned two government strategies for preparing the population for EU 
membership. One was to liberalise trade so that the Czech market could adjust to 
the pressure of international competition, and the other was to avoid subsidising 
various interest groups who could then later feel tempted to refuse EU 
membership for fear of losing privileges with the entry into the Union. 
Government information campaigns were not mentioned.125 
In January 1996 Zieleniec explained why the government was about to apply for 
membership and why it had chosen to accompany the application with a 
Memorandum. The Madrid summit, he said, offered a concrete perspective for 
membership, and the government had to give a serious response to this historical 
event. The integration of the Czech Republic into the EU depended mostly on 
domestic political and economic changes, he pointed out, but he also assured that 
EU politicians were aware that “without us the European Union is a torso, not the 
Europe that could face the challenges o f the 21. Century". Though quoting from 
the “historical” part of the Memorandum, Zieleniec stressed that daily needs 
called for Czech membership as well. EU decisions affected the Czech Republic 
at all levels, especially economically, and therefore the country had to take part 
in its decision-making at all levels. Zieleniec was frank about the asymmetry in 
Czech-EU relations and about the constraints it put on Czech decision-making, 
but he also pointed to the stabilising effect of membership, calling it definite 
proof that the changes since 1989 were irreversible.126 127
This more humble attitude came to characterise government statements 
after 1996. In the parliamentary debate about the application in February 1996 
Klaus proclaimed : "we must say that we enter this organisation such as it is. I 
think that none of us takes it seriously that we could hand in an application and 
trumpet forth in advance that we take half o f it and not the other half 1 think that 
everybody knows well that such a thing does not come into consideration".'21 
This is of course a far cry from what he stated around 1993.
1995b).
1-5 Zieleniec (1995a). Zieleniec also insists that there were no problems of co-ordination in 
Czech foreign policy, nor any disagreement between the President and the Government. 
Finally, Zieleniec stressed the achievement and importance of having had a democratic 
Germany integrated into a democratic, co-operating (western) Europe. Talking about 
economics he said that a monetary union or common European currency should not cause 
Czech resistance, since the Czech “koruna” was already strictly tied to a basket of western 
European currencies.
126 Zieleniec, Josef: Ceska republika podava prihlaSku, Lidove noviny 10.1.1996, p.8.
127 Klaus also refused to tell if the considered the EU to be democratic or what he thought 
about the role of the European Parliament, calling such discussions “premature”. He strongly 
warned against imposing conditions on the EU, calling it a “senseless, vain attempt” that 




























































































Presenting the policy statement of his new cabinet to the Czech Parliament in July 
1996, Klaus declared that Czech priorities were unchanged, in smooth 
continuation of the policy of the previous government. Now, however, he listed 
the fastest possible membership of the EU and NATO first as the main priority 
of the government, since the “Czech Republic historically, politically, culturally 
and economically belongs to the Euro-Atlantic civilisational process". Therefore, 
the government would speed up preparations for membership to be ready to 
initiate negotiations in 1998. It promised to negotiate the criteria for accession 
into the EU “responsibly”, but it was ready to “accept the main principles of the 
European integration in the shape that it will have at that time". Finally, it 
promised that it would inform the public “in suitable ways" about the extent and 
character of the rights and obligations stemming from membership of the EU and 
NATO.128
Talking to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Parliament in 
September 1996 Zieleniec too stressed the continuity of Czech foreign policy 
since 1993. Again, and unlike in 1993, integration into the main “European and 
trans-Atlantic political, economic and security structures" was listed first, before 
relations to neighbours, other bilateral relations and world trade and economy. 
With regard to the EU, Zieleniec stressed the importance of the Europe 
Agreement, the Czech application for membership and the Memorandum, as well 
as the practical steps taken by both the EU and the government to prepare for 
membership negotiations.129
Klaus himself seems to have adjusted his rhetoric to the realities of the 
Czech position and to have become more focussed in his critique, rather than to 
have radically changed opinions. Writing in Lidove noviny in January 1996 he 
mentioned how at a conference in Bonn he had met “Eurocrats” speaking “a 
special European newspeak” to the irritation of most. At the conference he had 
called for a more open and precise discussion of why Europe needed reform. He
policy toward the EU was based on national interests and that there would be plenty of room 
to discuss the pros and cons of the Union in due time, calling the project “frail and of course 
not always perfect" . But he also stressed again the overriding importance of the EU’s political 
aspect of securing peace and stability. For reference, see note 120.
128 Programove prohlaseni vlady C'eske republiky, Kap. II, Zahranicni politika, 23.6.1996, 
printed in Kotyk (1997), pp.241-242, quotations from p.241.
129 Zieleniec, Josef: Realizace zakladmch smeru zahraniini politiky Ceske republiky v r. 1996, 
printed in Kotyk (1997), pp.251-257, quotations from p.252. Bringing up the importance of 
the parliament in the preparation and negotiation process Zieleniec mentioned that he expected 





























































































had asked if it was really necessary to replace unanimity by more majority voting 
just because more members joined, since that could not in itself be “a final 
argument for the weakening o f every individual country”. He finally asked if 
within the EU set of treaties, it was the liberal Treaty of Rome part or the 
unifying Maastricht part that, if at all, needed revision.130
Speaking before a banking congress in Frankfurt in November 1997, 
shortly before he was forced to resign, Klaus brought up again the need to 
distinguish between instruments and goals in the debate about Europe. Integration 
was a means, not an end, he claimed, to reach relevant goals like peace, freedom 
and prosperity. But it was his impression that the “insufficiently structured and 
specified goal called peace" had such a special standing, that it almost blocked 
any serious debate about other goals or their mutual relationship. Turning to 
enlargement, Klaus called it "an enormous and at the same time unrepeatable 
European chance and challenge” and mentioned his strong belief “that the 
genuine and gradual enlargement of the EU will be a positive contribution to the 
goals / mentioned earlier”, but again he gave no explanation of why this was the 
case. The word ‘'gradual” is important here. Klaus went on to ask the EU to take 
the differences in achievements between the applicant countries into account and 
warned against a “bloc-like” thinking that would in reality only block 
enlargement. Obviously Klaus again sought to underline Czech superiority before 
other applicants, but one also detects a fear that the EU verbal commitment to 
enlargement was not sincere. Enlargement would - ceteris paribus - cost, and 
Klaus wished that this “should be accepted and expressed in a transparent, 
understandable way”. He pointed to the ambiguous, if not adverse, relationship 
between “deepening” and “widening” and criticised the EU unwillingness to treat 
and discuss these two processes as an interdependent whole.131
In sum then, from 1996 the government tempered its rhetorical strictures 
on the EU pari passu with the concrétisation of the perspective of membership. 
As membership became the number one foreign policy priority and as the
130 Klaus, Vaclav: Tento tyden byl piny evropskych véci, Lidové noviny 27.1.1996, p.8. This 
was a hint at his "second" version of EC/EU history. In March he reported to his Czech readers 
from a trip to Ireland, stressing the positive Irish experience with the EU. Financially, 
membership had been very beneficial, and the original Irish fears from the 1970’s of losing 
their national identity had been proven wrong. But on the other hand, Klaus added with what 
might be a hint at Havel, the situation in Northern Ireland proved that “membership o f the EU 
does not mean a simple and cheap elimination o f nationalism (as has often been stressed by 
naïve unionists)". Stripky z nâm maio znâmé zemë, Lidové noviny 2.3.1996, p.8.
131 Klaus, Vâclav: Europe on the Homestretch, keynote speech given at the 7m Frankfurt 





























































































government recognised that it would have to accept the EU as it is, the 
importance of national sovereignty was toned down, as was the image of “Maas­
tricht” as a “socialist” threat to national interests and identity. When “selling” the 
policy of seeking EU membership to a domestic audience the arguments centred 
on security and stability, as well as on the need to be present where decisions are 
made, if not on the “lack of alternatives”. When marketing enlargement to 
western European audiences the degree of concrétisation was even lower, and 
even a “homo economicus” like Klaus resorted to moral or historical arguments 
rather than to specific, future-oriented political and economic ones.
5. After Klaus - Towards a New Perspective?
The fall of Klaus on 30 November 1997 marked the end of an era in Czech 
relations with the EU. First,by sheer coincidence, a new situation arose with the 
December 1997 European Council decision in Luxembourg to start concrete 
accession talks between the EU and the Czech Republic by the end of March 
1998. Now, with the opening of the negotiation process, the implications of 
seeking membership became far more concrete, as did the strength or the 
weakness of the Czech negotiation position. And secondly, the turbulence in 
Czech domestic politics brought new actors to power, as Klaus’s Civic Demo­
cratic Party (ODS) split and a new party, the Freedom Union (US), was created, 
while the small coalition partner, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) 
collapsed.
Klaus was replaced by the caretaker government of Josef Tosovsky, former 
Governor of the Czech National Bank. Although equipped only with a limited 
mandate, the urgency of the NATO and the EU enlargement required the 
Tosovsky government to take an “activist” stance in both questions. This was 
reflected in the government’s policy statement from 27 January 1998, which put 
foreign relations first among the programme objectives, and promised to create 
a programme of national preparations for the EU accession talks before their 
beginning in March. Regional and international organisations were mentioned 
before bilateral relations (where “co-operation with Poland, Hungary and other 
candidate countries” was mentioned before the “interest in good relations with 
Slovakia"), indicating a foreign policy philosophy swing towards liberal institu­
tionalism. The EU was also mentioned twice in the domestic policy part of the 
statement, once when the government promised to step up legal harmonisation 
and once when it ‘‘attaches much importance to the adoption o f the regional 
policy principles in keeping with European Union practice."U1




























































































This change of attitudes was also reflected in numerous statements by the 
new foreign minister, Jaroslav Sedivy. Sedivy had a dissident background, and 
he had worked as an advisor to Jin Dienstbier during the “velvet revolution”, only 
to continue as a high ranking diplomat in the Czech foreign service* 133. In 
interviews and articles he emphasised the growing role of international 
institutions before state-to-state relations in modem international politics, and the 
promised a more clearly asserted “European dimension” in Czech foreign 
politics, including a new emphasis on regional co-operation. Sedivy also declared 
his intention to conduct a foreign policy that also had the support of the 
constructive (“statotvoma”) opposition, i.e. the Social Democrats, in whose 
attitude to Czech foreign policies he saw no problems. He strongly denied that he 
was a “Euro-sceptic”, recognising only the trade dimensions of EU co-operation, 
and mentioned both social policies and “third pillar” questions. Nor did he see 
any problem for the Czech Republic in the delegation of competences (as he 
preferred to call it rather than sovereignty) to the EU.134
5.1. The Social Democrats
The parliamentary' elections in June 1998 brought the Social Democrats (CSSD) 
to power for the first time, as Milos Zeman formed a minority government. When 
in opposition, the Social Democrats had presented themselves - with a clear hint 
at the Klaus government - as the most genuine adherents of the European Union 
since they - unlike Klaus - welcomed all aspects of EU co-operation. In the 
party’s electoral programme from 1996, An Alternative for our Country, adjusted 
and confirmed at the XXVIII. Congress of the CSSD in March 1997 one reads 
the following:
“We are convinced that it is in the interest o f the Czech Republic as soon as possible 
to become a member o f the European Union, which we understand not just as a zone 
o f free trade, but as a multidimensional European community, united by a common 
social, ecological, agricultural, transport, regional, foreign and security policy. A 
membership o f the European Union will guarantee the Czech Republic conditions for  
economic development in peace, security and stability, and a strengthening o f its 
social status. It will give citizens o f the Czech Republic access to education and job 
opportunities on the territory o f all states o f the European Union. The Czech Republic
of the Parliament of the Czech Republic 27.1.1998. English translation from the home-page
of the Czech government: <http://www.vlada.cz/vlada/dokumenty/progrproh.eng.htm> (as of 
March 1998)~
133 See his own account in Sedivy (1997).
134 Sedivy, Jar. (1998). See also the interviews in Lidove noviny 2.12.1997 and Pravo 
11.12.1997, Czech text from the home-page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 




























































































will have a possibility to co-detennine the politics o f one o f the biggest groupings in 
the world and participate with its own contribution in creating the European Union 
o f the 21. Century.” 135
Membership was thus described as advantageous both from a national 
perspective, and from the perspective of the citizens, who could find jobs and 
education. The programme also endorsed the principles of the Maastricht Treaty, 
including its social chapter, and the party commited itself to the ratification of the 
European Social Charter.
With another sneer at Klaus, the programme rejected “negativist 
approaches to the European Union, nationalistic attitudes and megalomaniac 
inclinations to put others to school that can only lead to the isolation of the Czech 
Republic”. It stressed how by contrast, the foreign policy of the CSSD had roots 
in the international Social Democratic movement and expressed its satifaction that 
Social Democratic parties played a major role in the governments of most 
member states and in the organs of the EU.136 Undoubtedly, this emphasis on the 
party’s European ties also aimed at countering Klaus, who presented himself as 
standing for “well-tried western standard solutions”, while accusing his 
opponents (including Havel) for wanting to “experiment” again with a “third 
way” between a market and a state-planned economy. References to (western) 
European paragons were thus used to grant legitimacy to domestic policies.137
In the same line, the party’s election programme from April 1998 promised 
to step up integration efforts at all levels, and the CSSD government policy 
statement from August 1998 abounded with promises to bring Czech legislation 
and political practice in accordance with EU standards. With new accents in 
comparison to Klaus and to some extent even to Havel, the government drew a 
very gloomy picture of the state of the country, both vis-à-vis its neighbours and 
in Europe at large. It demanded a “comprehensive inventory o f the state of Czech 
society”, which should “map the scope o f our internal debt and define the 
distance separating us from the average standard of European Union countries”.
135 Czech text from the home-page of the CSSD:
<http://www.socdem.cz/dokumenty/program_41 ,htm> (as of March 1998)
136 This “socialist” dominance in the EU has been a source of critique from conservative Czech 
politicians, see Handl (1995), p. 135.
137 See for instance the interview with Milos Zeman, Chairman of the CSSD, in Ekonom 
45/1997, pp. 10-12 “Opisujme od zapadnl Evropy” (“Let us copy from western Europe”). Here 
(p. 12) Zeman says: "We will not surprise the world with some original recipes, like the 
voucher privatisation, but take over the standard recipes o f the western European countries 




























































































The government expressed its conviction that
“our future integration into the European Union will help Czech society overcome 
some of the negative attitudes to foreign-speaking, looking and living people which are 
a hallmark of all isolated communities. The Government will do everything possible 
to make Czech society open itself up to the greatest possible extent to Europe and the 
world and transform itself into a multicultural society.” 138
One may wonder to which extent the Social Democratic electorate would 
subscribe to such statements, but the image of the Czech Republic as an “isolated 
community” faced with the task of overcoming the “distance” to the EU and thus 
to “European” standards is very clear, and miles away from the “equal partners” 
perspective long prevailing in the discouses of Havel and Klaus.
Still, it remains to be seen if the CSSD is able to transform its verbal 
commitment to integration into coherent policies. When in the Commission’s 
Progress Report from November 1998, the Czech Republic was strongly 
criticized for having made little progress in adopting the acquis since the Agenda 
2000 report of 1997, the government accepted this verdict, but it put all the blame 
on the previous governments, while insisting that the EU takes a favourable view 
of present Social Democratic plans and policies. Some of these, however, both 
before and after its coming to power, have pointed in other directions.The Social 
Democrats seem very reluctant to go ahead with the privatization of the banking 
sector demanded by the EU, and populist anti-German sentiments have been 
voiced at several occasions.139 There seems thus to be a big potential conflict 
between the unequivocal EU commitment of people like Foreign Minister Jan 
Kavan, and a more “traditionalist” faction, sceptical of both the economic and the 
national impact of integration.
138 Policy Statement o f the Government o f the Czech Republic, August 1998,quotations from 
Chapter 3. and Chapter 4.1. From: <http://www.vlada.cz/vlada/dokumenty/prohlas.eng.htm> 
(as of December 1998).
139 Around 1996 the CSSD exposed the government’s preparation and signing of joint Czech- 
German declaration to a vehement critique with populist, “anti-western” accents. Vaclav Klaus 
then vehemently attacked the Social Democrats for their attitude in this case, see above, note 
96. The senior Social Democrat Zden£k Jicinsky replied in Lidove noviny 21.5.1996 with the 
article “Juk mime diskutovat o Evrope? Odpovednfc!”. After criticising Klaus’s “Euro­
scepticism” and his neglect of the policial and security dimensions of European integration 
Jicinsky wrote: "In the Czech Republic it is however necessary to evaluate the country’s 
gradual integration into the EU not only from economic and technical (legislative etc.) points 
o f view, but also from the points o f view o f the further political development in Europe 
including the role o f Germany therein. Which Germany in which Europe - this is the key 
question for Germany's neighbours Without European integration - with a necessary and 




























































































Now in opposition, and after the split of the ODS when many “pro-Europeans” 
left the party, the ambivalent attitude of Klaus to the EU is becoming more 
pronounced. In its election programme from 1998, the ODS significantly placed 
its foreign policy statements under the headline “We defend the national interest", 
with a strong emphasis on the protection of Czech statehood. The party’s attitude 
to the EU was summed up in a sub-section titled “Integration yes, dissolution 
no”. ODS proclaimed that it had a “realistic” approach to integration, and it 
defined its goal as "a Europe o f nations, based on a free market, on partnership, 
open competition, and the protection o f stability and prosperity". The party was 
against any idea of a “social state”, and against any “dissolution” of the Czech 
state, be it in trans-national structures, or in a “Europe of regions”, all of it well- 
known motifs from Klaus’s more militant statements. Yet the party had to admit, 
"that we after our acceptance into the EU will have to accept the common rules 
of the game. Therefore we want that our citizens are presented with the 
advantages and with the costs that a full membership in the European Union will 
bring us, so that they on the basis o f these informations can decide for 
themselves. ”140
This can at best be called a half-hearted embrace of the idea of 
membership, and the last paragraph’s indrect recommendation of a referendum 
looks like an attempt to avoid giving a clear “yes” or “no” to the EU in its present 
shape.
5.2. The New Opposition
Klaus’s ambivalent attitude to the EU was also revealed in his reaction to 
the Commission’s November 1998 Progress Report. Klaus claimed that the 
report’s picture of the situation in the country was distorted, adding with what 
came close to a questioning of the legitimacy of the whole enlargement process 
that “civil sen’ants have nothing to blame the governments o f any state". The 
report, he claimed, was a “conscious policy o f European bureaucrats. In some 
countries there is a strong campaign against the enlargement o f the EU."141 *
Again then, Klaus seems just as afraid of being excluded, as he is sceptical of the 
institution in which he wants to be included.
There is no such “Euro-scepticism” in the two smaller right-wing parties 
represented in the Czech parliament after the 1998 elections. The Freedom Union 
(US) defines itself as a modern Conservative party with many young politicians,
140 Volebnf program ODS 1998, Chapter 5, Haji'me narodni zajem, found at
<http://www.ods.cz/kap5.hlml> (as of December 1998).




























































































willing to follow the “western European road” according to well-established 
Conservative principles. In the party’s political programme, the section on “We 
and Europe”, one meets the familiar historical arguments about the Czechs being 
“since times immemorial a part o f European civilisation, from which we for 
fourty’ years were artificially separated.” Therefore, the Czech “affiliation to the 
nations o f the Euro-Atlantic sphere” is stressed, although the Czech also have to 
be open to the rest of the world.142 Again, Europe more or less equals western 
Europe, and the tone is optimistic as to the role of the Czechs: they belong to the 
West, an historical fact that just awaits its institutional confirmation. The US 
election programme was a bit more specific on the party’s foreign policy 
objectives. In the section “We and the World”, the Czech belonging to the 
“western European and Euro-Atlantic civilisation” is again mentioned as the 
reason for wanting integration, but now the goal is made clearer:
“We want to take part in the building o f a united Europe. Our goal is the full 
integration o f the Czech Republic into the European Union in the first half o f the 
coming decade. Our vision is a strong and united Europe; we decidedly support a 
further widening and deepening o f the European integration. ”
This also includes support of the idea of a “Europe of regions”, so that foreign 
politics comes closer to the citizens, instead of being the sole domain of the 
state.143
As a party stressing its close ideological and political affinity with other 
European People's Parties the Christian-Democratic Party (KDU-CSL), strongly 
supports Czech membership of the EU in all its aspects, including Czech 
participation in the EMU, in the WEU, ratification of the social chapter etc. In a 
foreign policy manifesto from 1997 the KDU-CSL spoke out in favour of a 
federal Europe, and demanded both a widening and a deepening of the Union, 
aiming at a “strong, united, democratic, and civil Europe”. In its embrace of 
federalism, subsidiarity, and a whole, united Europe, party rhetoric had close to 
the one of Havel. More specifically, the party supported an increased use of 
majority voting (though with a weighting of votes to secure the rights of the small 
and medium-size countries of Europe), a strengthening of the European 
Parliament, and a Union closer to the citizens.144
1J* Svoboda a fad  - brcina do 3. tisicileti, Politickÿ program Unie svobody, Praha 9. unora 
1998, from:
<http://www.uniesvobody.cz/dokumenty/program/pr980209_politicky_program.html> (as of 
December 1998)
141 Volebnf program Unie Svobody 1998, the Chapter “My a sv e f, from 
<http://www.uniesvobody.cz/dokumenty/volby_98/prg_svet.html> (as of December 1998)




























































































So far, little has been said about Germany. The “German question” is, however, 
in the public as well as in the academic debate a key issue, affecting also the 
attitude to the EU. Often, the EU is presented as a way to avoid German 
hegemony, and the formula of a “European Germany” instead of a “German 
Europe” is frequently used.145 Politically, anti-German sentements are only 
exploited systematically by the fringe parties, the right-wing Republicans, who 
did not pass the 5% threshold at the 1998 elections, and the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM). Unlike the nationalist Republicans, who are 
simply and vocally against the EU. the KSCM has presented a comprehensive 
Manifesto, For a Democratic Europe, with some interesting and highly 
contraditory views on Europe and the EU.146 147
One main contradiction can be found in the calls for full national 
sovereignty as well as for European integration, another in the tension between 
a nationalistic rejection of everything German on the one hand, and calls for an 
unbiased non-nationalistic co-operation among all nations of Europe on the other. 
In its relations to the EU, the document both rejects the system as such and 
demands its reformation. According to the Manifesto, Europe needs a completely 
new order, totally different from the one that took shape in western Europe after 
1945. The creation of this new order “has to be a process o f an extensive, 
rational, efficient economic integration and at the same time a political 
unification on thoroughly democratic principles.” The Maastricht Treaty, 
however, is the problem rather than the solution, as a means to overcome the con­
tinued division of Europe (“it was conceived in the 1980’s and is thus itself also 
a relic o f bloc thinking"141), and as an economic model: Maastricht only asserts:
“the power o f big, especially financial capital against the interests o f the nations, the 
suppression o f both social rights and national specificities. It is a concept fo r  the 
economic and political hegemony o f Germany, whiclt with the blessing o f the USA has 
been given the major role in Europe” . l48
5.3. The Fringe Parties
<http://www.kdu.cz/English/foreign_pol.litm> (as of December 1998).
145 See Handl et al. (1997) for a thorough discussion of Czech-German relations.
146 “Pro demokratickou Evropu (Manifest KSCM)”, prepared by a group of foreign policy 
specialists of the Central Committee of the KSÔM, undated (probably from 1996 or 1997), 
found at the home-page of the KSCM: <http://www.kscm.cz/dokument/manifest.htm> (as of 
March 1998).
147 Curiously, the ambiguities in the KSCM Manifesto at times result in formulations which, 
like this one, are very similar to some of the statements of Vaclav Klaus.




























































































The Manifesto suggests instead “a concept o f European integration as a looser 
union o f a number o f groupings, of which one could emerge in the relatively more 
advanced central European countries”, which seems to keep the Czech Republic 
out of the EU. But at the same time the KSCM demands “a renegotiation o f the 
Maastricht Treaty and a fundamental démocratisation o f the whole system,” 
including a strengthening of the European Parliament and of mechanisms in the 
European Council that can protect the interests of small and economically weak 
member states.149 Finally, while warning against a “Fortress Europe” the 
Manifesto speaks with enthusiasm about the uniqueness of the enormous market 
that could emerge if Europe co-operated from the Atlantic to the Urals.150 In a 
sense, the Manifesto thus appears as an extreme expression of Czech ambiguities 
towards the EU and European unification.
are evident in this passage as in many other places. With a curious irony, KSCM accuses the 
“ruling circles” of the Czech Republic of seeking to link the country to the EU in all eternity 
("na vecne easy"), using a phrase from a notorious party slogan after 1949 of eternal loyalty 
to the Soviet Union. There are several similar attacks against “the submission o f Europe to a 
new Greater Germany” in the Manifesto.
149 Quotations from Chapter 1 of the Manifesto “We want a Europe of economic prosperity”. 
The remarks about the European Parliament etc. are from Chapter 6 "We want a Europe of 
democracy and human rights”. The almost schizophrenic attitude to what supra-national co­
operation must imply for the nation state is reflected in the title of Chapter 5 “We want a 
Europe of unity and national sovereignty”.
150 The anti-American accent is again visible, as is the echo of Gorbachev’s “common 
European home”. In their concluding chapter “We want a Europe for the future of human 
civilisation” the authors become even more “Euro-centric” when calling Europe (“which is 
culturally united and yet richly varied") the one among all civilisational centres that has the 
best preconditions for shaping a new world order: “Without Europe there will be no new 
civilisation, no new world order, no new global responsibility.” This discourse is very close 
to that of Havel, see in particular his speech in Aachen 1996 (Havel (1997), pp.52-61) where 
he ascribes a unique civilisational mission to Europe, in the past (“Europe seems to have 
introduced to the life o f mankind the categories o f time and historicity, to have discovered 
evolution and ultimately what ne call progress as well”- p.53), as in the future (“I f  Europe 
wants it can do something else, more modest yet more beneficial: through the model o f its own 
being, it can serve as an example that many diverse peoples can work together in peace 
without losing any part o f their identity: through its own behaviour, it can show that it is 






























































































Although far too sketchy, this discussion suggests that Czech political perceptions 
of the EU are being “Europeanised” in the sense that the cleavages in attitudes 
seem similar to what one meets in “non-post-communist” European countries 
(perhaps especially in countries like the Scandinavian ones (whether members or 
not), that have a “marginal” position vis-à-vis the “inner EU core”): a 
nationalistic EU-hostile right, a conservative-liberal camp that is for economic co­
operation while split on the degree of policial integration, a “pro-European”, 
“pro-social dimension” Social Democracy (though often with a sceptical elector­
ate), and a far left split between the internationalist potential of its socialist 
ideology and its “nationally isolationist” aversions to the present EU co­
operation.
We also saw how all parties, even those defining themselves in opposition 
to Klaus, used phrases and concepts in their discussions of the EU that were also 
found with Klaus or Havel. One may thus claim that together Klaus and Havel - 
both where they disagree and where they agree - have set the frame of reference 
for how to discuss these matters. In their texts there is a pool of references, 
symbols and phrases that form a common fund for the Czech discourse on 
Europe, the EU and the perspective of Czech membership. The signs may be 
changed, but although the Social Democrats with their emphasis on the 
“backward” state of Czech society have added new accents to the discussion, we 
have not come across a radically different way of defining the field.151
At one crucial point Havel and Klaus stood out as exponents of two 
sharply conflicting positions: in their views on the nation state. The sovereign 
nation state was not a central value in Havel’s political universe. He recognised 
the value of national communities, but in his perception they should not be 
interpreted collectively in ethnic terms or turned into a value in their own right, 
above all other levels of political identification and organisation. Klaus, by 
contrast, insisted upon the legitimacy of patriotism and "national feelings” and
151 If we claim that Havel and Klaus have been key actors in developing this “hegemonic” 
discourse, it of course does not imply that they have been alone in doing so or that they have 
been unaffected by others. The task here has not been to map "historically” the complex 
pattern of impulses and inspirations that has led to the formulation of one or the other part of 
this discourse, but rather to identify its key elements as they appear in the texts of was seems 
to be the two most central figures in this sphere. Unfortunately, a study of EU debates in the 
Czech press and in academic studies has had to be omitted, but the general observation is that 





























































































thus upon the legitimacy and necessity of the nation-state as the home of political 
sovereignty.
Their views upon the ideal shape of the EU were derived from this: Havel 
appeared as a federalist and a believer in the principle of subsidiarity between 
supra-national, national and regional or local institutions. For him, a politically 
and economically united Europe was the natural framework for the life of the 
Czech nation, and he called for the development of a “Euro-patriotism” to bolster 
the authority of the project. Klaus, by contrast, preferred an EU that was basically 
reduced to an inter-governmental organisation co-operating mostly on a 
liberalisation of trade and markets. A united, federal Europe would in his eyes not 
only be economically counter-productive, but also politically illegitimate and 
without popular support. In Klaus’s “philosophy” of European history, the task 
was to find an equilibrium between centralisation (unification) and fragmentation, 
and he identified the nation state as such a pivot. Havel sought in his 
“philosophy” the victory of good over evil, i.e. the victory of harmonious, 
democratic co-operation over egoism and force. In this sense, his vision is far 
more radical than Klaus’s.
This is also reflected in one major difference in their argument for the 
enlargement of the EU: Havel does not hesitate to threaten western Europe with 
the consequences of not engaging in the struggle in the east between good and 
evil. He demands interventionism, and grants to the side of the good not only the 
right, but also the duty to engage - even militarily as in former Yugoslavia - in 
what is in this case basically saving the “eastern Europeans” from themselves. 
Klaus, by contrast, totally abstains from this kind of argument, as he has been 
generally critical of international interventionism.112
But the discourses of the two also have many common features. Both insist 
on enlargement and for both, European integration/EU enlargement finds it 
primary justification in Europe’s character as one civilisational entity. When 
appealing to the EU both claim a Czech historical right to belong to the western 
European community and talk of a historic chance to overcome the “unnatural” 
division of Europe, so in this perspective political organisation is derived from 
culture, history and - frequently stressed - shared values.1,3 By contrast, 1523
152 Klaus’s reluctance may also be pragmatically founded. The EC/EU has generally been 
unwilling to admit non-consolidated democracies, and the evocation of risk scenarios only 
weakens the image of the transforming countries as stabilised democracies, see Dauderstadt 
(1996), p.218.
153 Although, of course, the “lesson” dictated by history can be re-interpreted according to 
one’s needs, as seen in the growing use of references to a “Euro-Atlantic" rather than simply 




























































































arguments about the concrete political, economic or security gains for western 
Europe from enlargement are rare (Havel’s threats about the consequences of the 
opposite excepted) and unspecified, even in Klaus’s speeches. This priority of 
arguments may well express a fear that enlargement will cost the EU (as spelled 
out by Klaus in 1997), and that the immediate benefit for the EU of admitting the 
Czech Republic (in terms of market access) is too small to justify enlargement if 
only rational “short-term” economic or political goals were used.
Conversely, when “selling” enlargement to a domestic audience a main 
argument has been the lack of alternatives. Havel used the horror scenario, while 
Klaus abstained from even discussing the consequences of not joining the EU. Of 
course both have also had positive arguments for enlargement. At the most 
general level, enlargement was said to bring the ultimate recognition of the Czech 
Republic’s right to belong where it wants to belong, and of its efforts to transform 
and “Europeanise” its political, legal and economic system. Membership also has 
a positive security dimension, both in the sense that the EU is seen as a guarantee 
for the external security of the Czech Republic,154 as of peace in Europe in 
general, and in the sense that membership is seen to add to the stability of Czech 
democracy. The advantages of taking part in a decision-making process that in 
any case affects the country were also brought up, and so were, in broad terms, 
economic advantages such as access to markets, education, jobs etc.
The government and the President frequently stressed that membership also 
meant obligations, that the Czech Republic accepted the EU without reservations 
and that the general historical-political significance of membership was far more 
important than possible economic gains or losses. But the overall impression is 
that the adherents’ way of presenting the perspective of EU membership creates 
high and rather vague expectations to what it will bring. “Europe” has been held 
as a goal (especially by Havel) and “Europeanisation” has become a general 
metaphor for how to behave, a panacea for all domestic illnesses. This may cause 
problems as membership draws closer, and its specific pros and cons begin to 
make themselves felt.
But Havel and Klaus have also had a note of reservation than cannot be 
reduced to a simple wish to have the advantages while fearing the costs in terms
with our voices.
154 This is of course closely linked to the question of NATO-membership, which for a long 
time seemed far less probable than joining the EU. Therefore, Czech politicians including 
Havel and Klaus have also mentioned their interest in the WEU. Nor have they been blind to 




























































































of loss of control. Both were at times highly critical of western Europe/the El! - 
of its self-complacency and unwillingness to understand or react to dangers that 
were, they claimed, perceived more clearly by the Czechs. Here their thinking 
about “Europe” is again similar to what one meets in other countries at the 
“margins” of the community. From this perspective, “Europe” (in the British or 
Scandinavian case) or “western Europe” (in the Czech) is again “somewhere 
else”, only now not as a goal but as the “Other” against whom a collective 
identity is formed. Yet this “othering” of western Europe had to remain 
incomplete and contradictory because of the simultaneous call for recognition. 
The Czechs (like the British or the Scandinavians) vehemently refuse to be 
“othered” themselves by “Europe”, i.e. to be defined as outsiders to the (western) 
Europe towards which they are drawn.
The picture remains ambiguous, and one may argue that this ambiguity has 
been characteristic of Czech national self-perception and the perception of the 
surrounding world ever since the “National Revival” in the early nineteenth 
century. With a certain simplification one can discern a near perpetual oscillation 
between three paradigms:
1) The “Go West” paradigm: European civilisation basically equals 
western European civilisation, and the Czechs have to strive to catch up 
with the West, culturally, politically and economically. In political terms, 
the West has mostly meant France, Britain (or even the USA), while there 
has often been considerable scepticism about Germany's western nature. 
In this perception, the Czech Lands are best described as a peripheral 
member of western European civilisation or even as a western outpost to 
the east of Germany.
2) The “east or west, home is best" paradigm, which comes in two 
versions: a purely national (making Bohemia the heart of Europe) and a 
broader “central European” one. This perspective accentuates the inherent 
qualities - most often in cultural or ethical terms - of central Europe and 
warns against the “exaggerations” or “aberrations” of western European 
civilization. Historically, western and central Europe are seen to form one 
common culture, but the nation or the region is warned not to blindly 
imitate the West. Instead, it claims, the Czechs may to some extent form 
a paragon for all of Europe to follow.
3) The "Slavic" paradigm finally stresses the tribal and cultural affinities 
of the Slavs and warns against western threats. In this perspective, only an 
alliance with Russia/the USSR can protect the Czechs from German 




























































































National Revival, this view has since then mostly been a “reserve option" 
when ties to the West were particularly strained. It was peripheral in the 
inter-war years, but “Munich” drastically enhanced its popularity, paving 
the way for a broad popular support of the pro-Soviet politics after 1945.151
For obvious reasons this third paradigm has played a very marginal role since 
1989, but this whole historical discoursive framework plays a role even today, as 
seen in the way both Havel and Klaus returned to Masaryk’s philosophy of 
European history. Masaryk was a “westerner”, but far from unconditionally so. 
and behind the official “western integrationalism” of the inter-war “first” Czecho­
slovak Republic, one may find many of the reservations vividly expressed in 
Klaus’s "lump o f sugar" metaphor. The fear of what may happen to Czech 
national identity if the flirt with western Europe goes too far has long roots and 
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133 See Bugge (1997) for numerous examples of how these paradigms were formulated in the
inter-way period. The second, “central European” paradigm is also often linked to the idea of
the Czechs and their country as a bridge between East and West, or - with a more dynamic,
Hegelian touch - a synthesis of both. This has been claimed by Saida, Cemy, Kundera and
other leading figures in Czech cultural life and was a particularly popular view in 1945-1948
and again around 1968, see Bugge (1996). Klaus’s attacks from 1993 on alleged “dissident”
wishes to make post-1989 Czechoslovakia another bridge between western and eastern Europe
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